



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**TELL ME WHAT I NEED TO KNOW: WHAT MAYORS
AND GOVERNORS WANT FROM THEIR FUSION
CENTER**

by

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September 2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 2009	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Tell Me What I Need to Know: What Mayors and Governors Want from Their Fusion Center		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Yi-Ru Chen		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

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14. SUBJECT TERMS mayors; governors; chief executives; decision makers; policy makers; executive engagement; fusion centers; intelligence; information sharing; trust; senior staff; senior personnel; local government; state government; strategic planning; accountability; situational awareness; risk communication; crisis communication; all hazards; all sources; classified information; Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 113	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

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**TELL ME WHAT I NEED TO KNOW: WHAT MAYORS AND GOVERNORS
WANT FROM THEIR FUSION CENTER**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

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ABSTRACT

Mayors and governors who represent high threat, high population density urban areas need strategic, decision-making advantages and, as such, should be significant users of fusion centers. These chief executives desire to understand the operating environment for their jurisdictions where daily risks and threats emerge from the complexities of an integrated world. Paradoxically, as will be outlined through this thesis, there is a lack of robust engagement between fusion centers and mayors and governors. While this thesis does not suggest executives know nothing about their fusion centers, the lack of direct and regular engagement is problematic given that top elected officials are responsible for leadership and funding decisions that prevent, mitigate, and respond to threats to their jurisdictions. Without engagement, fusion centers struggle to meet executive expectations, and mayors and governors miss critical opportunities to leverage their fusion centers. By addressing this engagement and expectations gap, fusion centers will be better situated to help these busy chief executives develop adaptive long-term strategic approaches for preventing, preparing, responding to and mitigating threats and all hazards in their jurisdictions, where they ultimately are held accountable by their constituency.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided the impetus for development of fusion centers by localities and states to address the void in terrorism information and intelligence sharing between local, regional, state, and federal entities. Since then, local, regional, and state fusion centers have evolved, with many focusing on all crimes and others serving as all crimes and all hazards one-stop shops providing information and services to a wider audience beyond the law enforcement community.

Mayors and governors who represent high threat, high population density urban areas need strategic decision-making advantages and, as such, should be significant users of fusion centers. These chief executives desire to understand the operating environment for their jurisdictions where daily risks and threats emerge from the complexities of an integrated world. This setting, where the confluence of security and emerging threats often intersect with politics and limited resources, is where mayors and governors often find a maelstrom of activities requiring their ability to understand and adapt to the environmental context and to calibrate their actions accordingly.

The first objective of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* is the prevention and disruption of terrorists attacks (2007). According to the *Strategy*, intelligence, developed from multiple sources of information, is a key aspect to the prevention of attacks, and mitigation of disaster impacts. Rollins and Connors (2007) explain, “the primary responsibility of today’s fusion centers is still to ensure that state and local leadership is knowledgeable about current and emerging trends that threaten the security of relevant jurisdictions” (p. 4).

Thus, the overarching goal of the fusion center should be to help the decision maker prepare for the challenges posed by the city or state operating

environment. Paradoxically, as will be outlined through this thesis, there is a lack of robust engagement between fusion centers and local and state chief executives. While this thesis does not suggest executives know nothing about their fusion centers, the lack of direct and regular engagement is problematic given that top elected officials are responsible for leadership and funding decisions that prevent, mitigate, and respond to threats to their jurisdictions. Without engagement, fusion centers struggle to meet executive expectations, and mayors and governors miss critical opportunities to leverage the potential capabilities that exist within fusion centers. By addressing this engagement and expectations gap, fusion centers will be better situated to help these busy chief executives develop adaptive long-term strategic approaches for preventing, preparing, responding to and mitigating threats and all hazards in their jurisdictions, where they ultimately are held accountable by their constituency.

Since 9/11, fusion centers have evolved to its current nascent stage. Over \$340 million federal funds have been invested, and over 70 fusion centers have been established nationwide (Napolitano, 2009). Localities and states have also invested significant amounts of local and state federal funds in their fusion centers, including staff, facilities, and technology (Rollins, 2008). During economically challenging times, federal funding for fusion centers may be threatened, further forcing cash-strapped mayors and governors to decide the fate of their fusion centers. If fusion centers are of no value to mayors and governors, then they may not receive funding and political support (Eack, 2008). If executive non-engagement continues, then the next evolutionary phase for fusion centers may be their demise.

This thesis aims to gain a better understanding of mayors' and governors' experiences with their fusion centers as the primary leaders accountable to their constituencies. This research examines how mayors and governors, and their fusion centers, can mutually benefit from engaging each other. Additional research will help provide recommendations on developing a robust mutual engagement. The desired outcome of this thesis is to emphasize the primary

roles mayors and governors have in homeland security. Just like the late Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill who said that all politics is local, all homeland security is also local (O'Neill & Hymel, 1994).

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis posits that the overarching goal of the fusion center should be to help prepare key decision makers to effectively govern in the complex operating environment of the city or state.¹ Thus, the primary research question is: Are fusion centers meeting the needs and expectations of mayors and governors? The primary purpose of this research is to find out if and how mayors and governors are gaining value from their fusion centers. As the key decision makers and highest-ranking elected officials in their jurisdictions, mayors and governors manage the finite resources available for the daily protection of their citizens, and, ultimately, the advancement of the nation's security. They are empowered by their elected office to frame policies and to change government actions. This thesis will attempt to:

1. Identify what mayors and governors are gaining from their fusion centers.
2. Explain what mayors and governors want from their fusion centers.
3. Explore ways for mayors and governors to effectively use their fusion centers.
4. Provide recommendations to improve the value of fusion centers to mayors and governors.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This research will contribute to literature that currently lacks the perspective of the executive as an end user of fusion center services. The level of engagement between chief executives and fusion centers, and the value

¹ This overarching goal does not obviate the operational and tactical spectrum of intelligence that a fusion center should be capable of delivering to all departments of government and their component organizations.

derived from such engagement, are undocumented. Fusion centers, much like federal intelligence agencies, should receive guidance from the policy makers they support. Precious resources and energy may be wasted or misdirected without this guidance (Johnson & Wirtz, 2008). Gookins (2008) and Lowenthal (2006) both assert that policy makers need to be involved in the intelligence development cycle because mayors and governors are effectively on the domestic frontline of defending the nation.

Fusion centers, as a local, regional, and state capability for gathering, assessing, and sharing information and intelligence, for preventing man-caused incidents, serve as a key role in the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* (White House, 2007). Mayors and governors will be in better positions to strategize, plan, and prioritize their limited resources, and be adaptive when they have actionable intelligence that is relevant to their region. Chief executives are generalists who are familiar with their government's operations and resources, understand the pulse of the community and their constituency, and have the political means to navigate and negotiate. They understand the need to strike a balance between the sometimes extreme and costly security measures against an abiding public interest, for privacy and free expression. These top, elected officials also have the capacity to elevate issues and frame discussions, in ways that are salient to the citizens of their jurisdictions.

This research will provide insights to executive perspectives on their fusion centers and services, and offer ways to help improve their mutual engagement. Future research efforts should be able to build on this exploratory research as an initial understanding of the executive as the end user, examine the efforts to help fusion centers meet the needs and expectations of mayors and governors, and identify ways for fusion centers to engage them. Finally, this research on local and state executive perspectives will help inform future development of local, regional, and state fusion centers.

D. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE, AND CHALLENGES

For purposes of this research, intelligence is not raw data or information that has not been analyzed, it is defined as “information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy makers” (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 2). Therefore, policy requirements need to be established and a synthesis of information into distilled intelligence is necessary to support the policy maker.

Although fusion centers are still evolving and maturing, they have the potential to provide mayors and governors with information and intelligence on and visibility of emerging issues such as threat patterns, events and issues of interest, and long-term concerns such as critical infrastructure vulnerabilities including the electrical grid, water security and public transportation systems, etc. Fusion center capabilities, if leveraged appropriately by engaged mayors and governors, should ultimately help mayors and governors be better informed when they shape strategic policies and budget decisions. Therefore, mayors and governors should have a vital role in all parts of the intelligence process and be actively engaging their fusion centers.

Extensive literature on fusion centers thus far has focused on the internal processes. Very little is known about mayors’ and governors’ knowledge of fusion center capabilities and levels of satisfaction with products and services. State and local chief executives are not known as traditional consumers of intelligence. However, mayors and governors need to have visibility into their fusion centers’ capabilities, products, and services in order to better leverage these resources to serve their needs. If mayors and governors identify what they want to know, fusion centers will be better able to develop the products and services to satisfy their requirements. Fusion centers are predominantly geared toward the needs of frontline law enforcement. This is not surprising owing to the executive sponsorship, hosting and staffing of almost all fusion centers by law

enforcement agencies. With few exceptions, mayors and governors do not have insight to fusion capabilities, and fusion centers do not have the opportunity to receive guidance and feedback from the executive.

Active engagement by mayors and governors in the intelligence process may cause some concern with the potential for political manipulation of intelligence. This fear is exemplified in the Bush Administration's decision to invade Iraq, despite weak weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat intelligence, and citing of selective and questionable sources to justify decisions. The danger of intelligence exploitation for political purposes is also possible at the local and state levels. Johnson and Wirtz identified three different ways that policy makers could inadvertently, or purposefully, influence intelligence development when engaging analysts (2004). Policy makers should be cautious of giving the impression they are exerting pressure for certain findings, indicating favoritism towards particular types of analyses, and allowing professional advancement based on mediocre work (Johnson & Wirtz, 2004).

Mark Lowenthal's *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* describes the first phase of the intelligence development process as identifying requirements or the type of information the consumer needs (2006, p. 54). Processes for chief executives to receive performance metrics, and to provide feedback and guidance, are familiar within many executive offices. For example, many large cities developed data-driven programs to help identify deficiencies in their services, which provided chief executives the opportunity to respond with tactical improvements or strategic policy changes. New York City Police Department developed the Compstat program in the 1990s, Baltimore City created CitiStat in 2000 to focus on city services, and Washington, DC designed CapStat in 2007 to improve government performance and services. Through these data-driven accountability programs, chief executives are provided the tools to identify problem areas, and develop new strategies and policies, for meeting desired outcomes. Performance indicators and metrics based on a foundation of

executive level requirements for the fusion center should add to executives' effectiveness in evaluating and providing feedback.

Some may argue that mayors and governors should not be direct consumers of fusion products, because fusion centers are primarily run by law enforcement, and are geared towards the law enforcement community. A 2008 survey of five California fusion centers show that majority of customers were identified as law enforcement personnel (Nenneman, 2008). However, many fusion centers are evolving towards an all-hazards focus, and their products serve a wider community of emergency responders, public health, and fire departments. According to the 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress on fusion centers, "A little more than 40% of fusion centers interviewed described their center as all-hazards as well as all crimes" (Rollins, p. 22).

The *Fusion Center Guidelines* (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006), however, notes the need to recognize the political climate of the region where fusion centers are located and the importance of creating a working relationship with political officials and policy makers. Mayors and governors often are the public face of the government response to disasters and emergency incidents and on the receiving end of public scrutiny for failed government actions. Rather than wait until the need to respond to an incident, executives should be able to leverage predictive information from fusion centers to help them become proactive in addressing challenges to security and safety.

Establishing awareness of issues in advance is a common practice for local and state chief executives. Mayors and governors typically meet daily with staff on policy, operational, budget, political, and community issues, and continuously assess if government services are efficient, while providing their staff feedback on what they want to know about or understand. In essence, chief executive staffs create their own method of information collection and, in advising mayors and governors, derive their own analysis based on dynamic piecemeal information from open sources and informal information sharing. This is akin to

the intelligence cycle that includes planning and direction, collection requirements, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback. Ultimately, this executive process helps to inform mayors and governors when they make policy and budget decisions.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

As outlined in this introductory chapter, the main focus of this thesis is on the executive perspective and experience with their fusion centers. Chapter II summarizes the literature reviewed for this research, confirms a lack of available literature and data on executive engagement with fusion centers, and underscores the dearth of information related to gauging executives' experiences and satisfaction with their fusion centers. It also sets the context for Chapter III in the research design and methodology used to capture the views of this key decision-making group.

Chapter IV encapsulates the interview results from senior level officials, who serve as executive agents, and are most engaged with fusion centers. Highlights of their responses to each question can be found in the appendices.

Drawing from the generalized interview responses, which identify the need for fusion centers to better understand the role of the executive, Chapter V provides: an overview of the role of mayors and governors, their need for situational awareness and sense making, their methods and measures for developing that knowledge, the critical importance of risk and crisis communications as high-profile elected officials, and the significance of trust internally within the government and externally with the public.

Chapter VI examines the realities of how raw, unvetted information is often used to inform chief executives, and the inadequacies of it, how fusion centers can add value by providing a strategic decision-making advantage to chief executives, so they can avoid strategic surprise in the future, and a brief

discussion on how local and state authorities view the federal control of access to information as further widening the information sharing gap between federal and local and state authorities.

Exploratory interviews with key senior personnel, as representatives of the executive, led to further understanding in Chapter VII of how executive staff members prepare the key decision maker. A prominent example is the Presidential Daily Briefing at the federal level, and the instrumental role of key staffers.

The value proposition of fusion centers for mayors and governors is offered in Chapter VIII, through a strategy canvas, and recommendations are made for sustaining their value with engaged chief executives. Finally, Chapter IX offers concluding thoughts on the research and suggests future research areas for contributing to this exploratory work.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A significant amount of literature exists on the topic of fusion centers. A search of the term “fusion centers” in the Homeland Security Digital Library resulted in over 4000 related articles. Issues within this topic have evolved since September 11, 2001, from the importance of filling intelligence gaps at the local, state, tribal, and federal level (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2002; Flowers, 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004; Department of Justice [DOJ], 2006), to the need for establishing fusion centers (National Governors Association [NGA], 2005; State and Local Fusion Centers, 2006), and to the current challenges faced by fusion centers (Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General [DHS OIG], 2008; German & Stanley, 2007; Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2007; Magnuson, 2007; Nenneman, 2008; Focus on Fusion Centers, 2008; Rollins, 2008). However, fusion center literature is virtually silent on mayors and governors as consumers of fusion center services.

Research focused on local and state chief executives yielded information reflecting interest in prevention of terrorism and emergencies. The U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) and the National Governors Association (NGA) conducted a number of surveys giving insight to the executive perspective. USCM issued a report in 2002 titled, “Homeland Security: Mayors on the Frontline,” and the NGA produced an issue brief in 2007 titled, “2007 State Homeland Security Directors Survey.” While neither the USCM nor NGA surveys addressed the end user satisfaction with fusion centers, both groups identified mayors and governors as having a lead role in prevention of and response to terrorism and emergencies.

As noted in “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” characteristics of the 40-plus fusion centers examined at the time varied by each center; thus, no centers are exactly alike (Rollins, 2008). Today, there are 72

fusion centers nationwide (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009). The characteristics of each fusion center are based on the needs of each jurisdiction. A fusion center's products and services may vary depending on the resources of the fusion center and needs of those who use the center's products and services. Also, the concept of the fusion center was recently further defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the National Conference on Fusion Centers in March 2009, as a place where "prevention, planning, and consequence management" can be facilitated by the fusion center, if the right people are involved (Napolitano, 2009). However, there is no specific mention of an interactive relationship between fusion centers and executives.

As policy makers, research also shows that chief executives should have a central role in the fusion intelligence process (Gookins, 2008; Johnson & Wirtz, 2008; Lowenthal, 2006; Teitelbaum, 2005). The President receives the Presidential Daily Briefing prepared by the Director of National Intelligence and the Economic Intelligence Brief prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (Hosenball, 2009). At the local and state level, mayors and governors constantly gather information to aid their decision and policy-making process. Fusion centers are uniquely positioned to assist mayors and governors. According to the CRS report, *Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress*, one of the value propositions of fusion centers is that they fuse disparate streams of data from multi-source information or intelligence, produce analyses that generate knowledge, and are actionable for prevention, protection, and planning purposes (Rollins, 2008).

With the free flow of information available from open sources, mayors and governors increasingly rely on open sources of information and data. Open source is "general, widely available data and information; 'gray' literature; targeted commercial data; and individual experts" (Sims, 2005, p. 65). Open source information can generate the information, which can be turned into intelligence and knowledge that executives lack and desire (Kipp, 2005). Because open source information can be overwhelming and unvetted, research

indicates that fusion centers, when staffed by capable analysts, are best positioned to leverage information, develop intelligence, and generate knowledge or actionable intelligence for policy makers (Isaacson & O'Connell, 2002).

Research of mayors' and governors' spans of priority activities as reflected in news articles and the media reveals that their executive roles beyond decision and policy making include providing the public with visibility into risks through effective official communications and being visibly engaged during crisis management. This was the case during September 11, 2001, when New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani was visible throughout the crisis, providing information and updates to the public through the media (Purnick, 2001).

When risk is communicated to the non-government community, trust towards government increases, and risks are shared between governments and the communities they serve (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). Such establishment of trust and understanding between the government, community, and the private sector helps to increase the efficiencies and collaboration in collective prevention and response to risks (Covey, 2006; Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano & Kelly, 2008; Magnuson, 2007). The local and state response to the transatlantic plot involving airplanes in 2006 is an example of how mayors and governors, specifically, the Mayor of Los Angeles and the Governor of New York State, responded to a potential threat, ("Governor Pataki," 2006; "L.A. Mayor Villaraigosa," 2006). In both cases, they assured the public that there was no specific threat to their city and state. Each executive told of his communication with the Department of Homeland Security and British authorities to establish that there were no direct threats but that the Transportation Security Agency security level would be increased as a precaution. Conversely, literature on lessons learned from the local, state, and federal responses to Hurricane Katrina point to failures of the President, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, Louisiana Governor, and New Orleans Mayor in demonstrating leadership and maintaining a public presence (H.R. Rpt. No. 109-377, 2006; Sellnow et al., 2009; S. Rep. No. 109-322, 2006).

Nontraditional literature reviewed for fusion center information, executive perspectives, and budget and policy information included state and city websites such as Commonwealth of Virginia (www.virginia.gov), state of Maryland (www.maryland.gov), District of Columbia (www.dc.gov), Chicago City (www.cityofchicago.org), New York City (www.nyc.gov) and Los Angeles City (www.ci.la.ca.us). The majority of sites did not have fusion center information.

Statutorily, strong mayors and governors frame the policy and budget strategy for their cities and states through their annual budget development process. That process usually includes a rigorous examination of agency operations and performance from the prior year and is dependent on anticipated revenue. The executive's policy priorities are sometimes reshaped after the legislative body's review and feedback. Mayors and governors may be able to tap into fusion center capabilities to influence the policy discussions on critical infrastructure protection, emergency and health preparedness, prevention and response, public safety resources such as law enforcement, and fire and emergency medical services.

Key to the fusion process is the exploitation of disparate information data streams through collaborative, multi-discipline analysis by analysts with diverse subject matter expertise to produce actionable intelligence tailored for the consumer. This multi-agency perspective, multi-discipline expertise collaboration is critical to fusion center staffing and analytical product development (Napolitano, 2009). Research shows that since Hurricane Katrina, federal, state, and local governments have continually stressed the importance of multiagency collaboration in emergency preparedness and response (Getha-Taylor, 2007; Larsen, 2007; National Association of State Chief Information Officers [NASCIO], 2007). As a collaborative environment, fusion centers also present opportunities where, with the right staffing, prevention, planning, and consequence management can be realized. Examples of innovative collaborative environments exist in various successful companies (e.g., Google, Microsoft,

Bloomberg L.P.) and are emulated by the public sector, such as the city hall Bullpen workspaces for New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Washington, DC Mayor Adrian Fenty (Nakamura, 2006).

Literature on networks reveal that social networking developed through Web 2.0 is emerging as a new model for mayors, governors, and their constituents to foster better information exchange with each other (Epstein, 2009; Holbrook, 2007). City and state websites, and other social network sites such as Twitter and Facebook, are extremely popular channels for political leaders to connect with their constituents, and provide another public visibility component used by executives. Newark, New Jersey Mayor Cory Booker and San Francisco, California Mayor Gavin Newsom were both reportedly the two politicians with the highest number of Twitter followers compared to the combined total of every single U.S. mayor, 49 governors,² and all members of Congress (Epstein, 2009). These forms of communication allow the personalities of the elected official to be witnessed firsthand by the public without official, formal filters. This level of direct engagement through unspoiled short bursts of communication has helped to establish the authenticity that is difficult to identify through press statements and official speeches.

Thus, the allure of connecting with the average constituent may also be used to share other types of information, such as advice on preventive measures against hazards, issuing crime alert notifications or warnings, and requests for community responses to natural disasters. Likewise, information collected through social networks may enable fusion centers to develop better intelligence and provide informative and relevant recommendations to the policy and decision maker (Ressler, 2006; Stephenson & Bonabeau, 2007).

The literature review has shown that while the topic of fusion centers is wide-ranging, it remains silent on mayors and governors as key customers. Chief executives have an abiding interest in the prevention of terrorism and

² Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California is ranked in the top 10 of highest number of followers for politicians on Twitter (Epstein, 2009).

emergencies and have the responsibility to respond to acts of terrorism and emergencies. Research also shows that chief executives frame the policies and allocate resources for their jurisdiction. Given that fusion centers are a prevention tool based on information and intelligence, it would suggest that fusion centers should be an ideal tool to help mayors and governors frame their policies related to public safety and allocating resources better. This literature review has identified the need to extract executive perspectives and experiences and apply them as guidance and requirements to better enable fusion centers to be responsive to executive level needs.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research on executives' decision-making processes, perspectives, engagement of, and satisfaction with their fusion centers, is summarized in Table 1. The research methodology includes a review of scholarly literature and research, government reports and documents, professional and academic journals, and multimedia news articles. It also includes a review of non-scholarly literature, such as information from cities and states websites, views of mayors and governors representing large urban areas, as well as research from websites for executive networks including the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Governors Association, and general interest books. Because of the lack of information in available literature on executives' engagement and degree of satisfaction with fusion centers, exploratory interviews (summarized in Chapter IV) were conducted in May 2009 with senior staff, mayors, and governors of the Urban Areas Security Initiatives (UASI) Tier 1 jurisdictions.

Table 1. Sources of Information

	Executive decision-making process	Executive perspective of fusion centers	Executive engagement of fusion centers	Executive satisfaction with fusion center services
Scholarly literature & research; academic text books	✓			
Government reports and documents	✓			
Professional and academic journals	✓	✓		
Multimedia news articles	✓	✓		
Government websites	✓	✓		
Executive network websites (USCM, NGA)	✓	✓		
General interest books	✓			
Exploratory Interviews	✓	✓	✓	✓

For interviews, the researcher considered reaching out to the 20 largest UASI sites instead of the seven Tier 1 areas. However, given the high-profile nature of the cities in the Tier 1 areas, two of which were attacked on September 11, 2001, the UASI Tier 1 sites were considered highly relevant because of their high-threat and high population density designation by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). An additional factor for ultimately selecting the members of the Tier 1 UASI group for a census of their experiences is that local and state chief executives established or agreed to fund these fusion centers serving their urban areas. The National Fusion Center Coordination Group (NFCCG) issued a list of 70 fusion centers with 50 primary state designated fusion centers and 20 urban area fusion centers (2009). All Tier 1 UASI areas had a fusion center on the NFCCG list. The Tier 1 urban areas also receive the largest share of homeland security grant funding compared to the rest of the urban areas across the country (see Figure 1). Therefore, it was assumed that

UASI Tier 1 executives would be attuned to using fusion center intelligence to support policies and decisions governing prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

This research did not specifically identify the state or local fusion centers serving the Tier 1 UASIs nor does it focus on the products and services provided by specific fusion centers. It also did not distinguish the difference between local, regional, and state fusion centers. Rather, the focus of the research was on the chief executives' satisfaction and perspectives as a key indicator for the value they place on these fusion centers. The assumption was that the more satisfied and the more they sought engagement with their fusion centers the more value they placed on fusion centers. The engagement by and satisfaction of chief executives with fusion centers are addressed and extrapolated in Chapters V, VI, and VII.

The Tier 1 UASI areas identified for this research included the National Capital Region that encompasses the entire District of Columbia, localities in Northern Virginia, and Western Maryland. Also identified were New York City, Jersey City, Newark, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Long Beach, and San Francisco. As noted earlier, each of these urban areas had a local, regional, or state fusion center (National Fusion Center Coordination Group [NFCCG], 2009). Two governors' offices were included in this initial census because of the executive offices' involvement in their UASI. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the state of Maryland were included in the census because of the executives' involvement in the National Capital Region UASI.

This research also draws on the author's personal experience and observations working in the Office of the City Administrator, in the Executive office of the Mayor of Washington, DC. The author's involvement in the National Capital Region Homeland Security Senior Policy Group as a state representative for the District of Columbia provided a unique opportunity to engage senior representatives from the governor's offices of Virginia and Maryland on their experiences with fusion centers. Through other professional networks, this

author also engaged in several private conversations with experts and professionals that validated the information uncovered through the interviews.




Figure 1. FY2009 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Awards (after U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. A-2)

Recognizing the nature of political offices, which tend to have busy schedules and are focused on their constituencies or addressing policy priorities, it was anticipated that political staff would not find this research topic and objective of performing an analyses of executive interviews a compelling reason for their executive to be personally involved. Therefore, to give voice to the executive, a second group of people was identified: senior staff to mayors and governors with which these chief executives regularly interact and engage, and senior staff members have the best insight to the executive decision-making process.

To establish communications, this researcher identified individuals cultivated through professional networks, through senior level staff from executive offices, and through current and previous colleagues working in the jurisdictions targeted for research. Once introductions or referrals were established, this author spoke to each key contact requesting that his or her mayor or governor participate in the interview. While some contacts were helpful in facilitating the interview request, the author received no responses directly from any mayor or governor. For those chief executives with whom the researcher could not establish communications, an email with the interview questions was sent to mayors and governors to ensure due diligence in demonstrating that the opportunity to respond was provided to mayors and governors. Interview questions were developed in advance, and approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board.

In explaining the lack of responses from chief executives, some staff to a number of chief executives chose not to ask their executives to participate in interviews but offered to provide responses themselves. Thus, the second group, i.e., previously identified senior staff was interviewed with the same questions.

Pre-developed questions ranged from the baseline assessment of executive engagement, frequency level of briefings and information, request

fortailored briefings, feedback on services and products, to whether fusion centers contributed to executive decision making, and how fusion centers could be more valuable in the future (see Appendix A).

To elicit candid responses, exploratory interviews were requested with the guarantee that responses would not be attributable and that interview subjects would remain anonymous. While some expressed concerns with participating, senior level government representatives from six out of the 11 identified cities and states responded. Only one respondent provided responses through email. Some respondents did not feel comfortable giving feedback using email due to concerns that government email records might be obtained through Freedom of Information Act or other means. Other respondents did not feel they could adequately provide their responses via email. Some respondents initiated phone calls to this researcher and bypassed the email response process. One respondent met with the researcher and spoke at length. In another forum, two respondents met with the researcher in person to share recent reactions to a professional network gathering on information sharing between the local, state, and federal governments. At all times, respondents were made aware that this researcher took notes throughout, and they were told that their identities would not be revealed, nor their remarks attributed to their organization.

Exploratory interviews conducted in person or over the phone ranged between 45 minutes to 90 minutes. The feedback reflected an array of substantive responses, from additional discussion topics beyond the scope of this research topic to responses that were limited due to lack of personal insight to the executive's perspective. Phone calls, additional emails, and face-to-face meetings helped clarify responses.

B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

The analytical framework for identifying the end user's satisfaction with fusion centers in this research is limited in several ways. The lack of representative data in executive-provided responses from the UASI Tier 1 urban

areas remains an obstacle to refining the impact and value of fusion centers to this key customer group. The lack of executive-provided responses prevents an understanding of their true needs and for identifying ways to meet those needs. The lack of willingness of the majority of designated individuals representing chief executives to provide written responses reveals uneasiness with public exposure of their role and with their characterization of the utility of fusion centers on behalf of their chief executives. However, the willingness of three of the six respondents representing major metropolitan areas to speak at length, including one who responded to nearly all interview questions through emails, yielded valuable insight to their chief executives' mindsets, interactions, and satisfaction levels.

Of the six interviews, two respondents did not provide full responses. One of those two respondents indicated that the fusion center was not on the executive's radar; therefore, there had been no engagement with it or expectations of it. The other respondent expressed great satisfaction with their jurisdiction's law enforcement agency and indignation over the need for direct executive engagement with the fusion center when the executive regularly communicated with the chief of their law enforcement agency. The focus of Chapter IV will be to summarize the responses of the substantive interviews and the less detailed responses, and draw general inferences that are explored in the following chapters.

C. GENERALIZABILITY

Since interviews were the primary research source for answering what mayors and governors of UASI Tier 1 jurisdictions were gaining and seeking from their fusion centers, and to identify what would help them effectively use their fusion centers, the author formed general ideas based on the data collected from interviews with executive staff. The findings from the six respondents, therefore, represent a census of the Tier 1 UASI areas. Generalizability is reasoning predicated on a frequent occurrence that predicts similar occurrences in the

future (Barnes et al., 2005). However, the exploratory interviews performed were not sufficient in number nor did the content reflect the recurring themes to permit high confidence generalization beyond the Tier 1 UASI.

IV. SUMMARY RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS

Exploratory interviews with senior staff who understand what the executive needs for governing provided insight to the experiences and viewpoints of chief executives on fusion centers. Interviews with six jurisdictions were conducted out of the 11 jurisdictions that were identified and contacted. The following themes best summarize the interview/census response: (a) baseline assessment of executive engagement; (b) frequency level of briefings and requests; (c) feedback on services and products; (d) impact to executive decision making. An additional section (e) on improving fusion center value for the executive provides an analysis of the interview results. All interviews and discussions were conducted on the basis that no information would be directly attributable to any jurisdictions. Interview questions are included in Appendix A.

A. BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE ENGAGEMENT

Interview responses reflect that while the idea of a fusion center holds great promise for prevention and forecasting of threats based on multi-source information and pattern analysis, the majority of mayors and governors do not regularly engage with their fusion centers directly as the primary source of threat information and actionable intelligence.

Interview responses revealed that the majority of chief executives have never received direct briefings by fusion center personnel. The majority of chief executives receive information directly through their homeland security advisor, chief of the law enforcement agency, or equivalent public safety senior personnel. Respondents indicated that the fusion center is a law enforcement agency component and the director of the law enforcement agency receives regular fusion center briefings. Therefore, based on the significance of a threat, the executive would be briefed when necessary and as determined by the law enforcement agency chief, public safety director, homeland security advisor, or

the executive's senior staff. Another reason cited for lack of direct executive-fusion center engagement was that the executive was too busy and relied on senior staff to determine the need for briefings.

The majority of respondents shared that the level of threat intelligence received in briefings was not relevant, specific, useful, or meaningful enough, in the context of the executive's governance purview or responsibility, to warrant any direct engagement of the executive. One respondent had trouble understanding why the executive would need to have direct engagement with the fusion center when it was a function of the law enforcement agency. Another respondent simply said he did not think the fusion center was on the executive's radar, that he did not believe there was any direct contact, and doubts that the executive has any particular expectations for the fusion center.

Senior staff that provided responses viewed their role in receiving threat briefings as the executive substitute, and they expected detailed and relevant information pertaining to their jurisdictions. The majority of respondents noted that they believe their fusion center's intelligence analysis should yield specific information that could help them recommend to the executive the adjustment of resources or development of policies to support homeland security and public safety. A minority of respondents expressed satisfaction with the intelligence information developed by their fusion center.

B. FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF BRIEFINGS AND REQUESTS

The majority of respondents received some form of daily briefing, regular alerts or summaries of information such as raw suspicious activity reporting, terrorist screening list hits, fire investigations, specific and aggregate crime information, health and safety warnings, law enforcement safety threat summaries and recommended actions, and news on international and domestic terror threats or attacks. Interviews revealed that senior staff, while appreciative of fusion centers' efforts in providing regular briefings or notifications, found that they needed to request specific information in order to receive tailored briefings.

Respondents expressed the expectation that fusion centers should know or anticipate the executive's needs and frequency for particular briefings and levels of details.

Two respondents were positive about the level of proactive briefings they received without their prompting. One of the two respondents noted that while proactive briefings met their executive expectation, the executive office still had to specifically request H1N1 information and workplace violence information, despite rising H1N1 pandemic concerns and, in this particular jurisdiction, a recent violent incident in a workplace. Another respondent noted the need to request, on numerous occasions, threat assessments for anticipated events. The same respondent had previous experience with the service or product not being delivered without prompting and a deadline.

The level of effort involved in requesting briefings ranged from minimal to high. Few respondents made direct requests to fusion centers due to lack of open channels between the executive and their fusion center, while one respondent noted that requests for weekly briefings was not welcomed by the law enforcement entity overseeing the fusion center due to lack of staff resources and lack of threat information. The same respondent also indicated that requests for products and briefings often took weeks because of the internal law enforcement agency legal review and approval process and scheduling availability of the agency briefer. Another respondent said that his executive received daily briefings and was in regular phone contact from the head of their law enforcement entity so there was no need to request for briefings.

C. FEEDBACK ON SERVICES AND PRODUCTS

The majority of respondents expressed an underwhelming level of insightful information from their fusion centers regarding details, jurisdictional relevancy, and pattern analyses. Chief executives, according to the majority of senior staff responses, want to be made aware of their jurisdiction's threat environment and daily operational environment. However, all but one respondent

said they are not receiving information from fusion centers that meets those expectations. While respondents said they received daily briefings, they also noted that fusion center-developed intelligence was not specifically relevant to the mayor's or governor's needs.

The majority of respondents were concerned with the quality of information generated and the apparent lack of intelligence developed from multi-source information. One respondent suggested that language used in reporting raw suspicious activity reports, which sometimes are passed on from federal or other sources, seemed unsophisticated and did not focus on the actual suspicious activity.

Several respondents commented that there did not seem to be fusion occurring, meaning that fusion center products appeared only to have a law enforcement perspective even if the content of the product was predominantly about a health or fire issue. One respondent further indicated extreme general dissatisfaction saying that his fusion center's daily summaries were not tailored for the executive or non-law enforcement audiences and felt the product was developed as a general set of information for all recipients. The primary concern was that non-law enforcement personnel would not understand the information reported. This respondent felt that this level of effort did not warrant the fusion center's standing as a critical node for intelligence.

The majority of respondents said that they received a plethora of redundant information from multiple sources and networks outside of their fusion center, including online news media. One respondent said the information from the fusion center was transactional rather than value-added, meaning that the fusion center appeared to pass on exactly the same information received through other networks with no further local or regional insight to add jurisdictional relevancy. The majority of respondents expressed an interest that fusion centers be the central body in their jurisdiction or region to receive or extract reporting from all levels of intelligence communities and from other multiple sources of data and information and then to provide a synthesis of products that have

unique or newly distilled intelligence insights. They felt that the executive's office was saturated with generalized, irrelevant, non-insightful, non-actionable products and briefings for the executive.

The majority of respondents shared that the lack of insights to the terrorist tactics and strategies used in overseas and domestic attacks and lack of recommendations based on lessons learned for preparing and responding to natural disaster events was a disservice to the executive. Two respondents said the lack of fusion center coverage of the day-to-day issues such as crime patterns and local threats or risks were missed opportunities to making fusion center products relevant and timely. Another respondent wondered how their fusion center contributed to or benefited from the larger network of fusion centers if fusion centers did not provide local and regional insight.

Several respondents noted the lack of willingness by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share information through their local and state fusion centers, and how they believe it impeded their fusion center's efforts to produce useful products. They were under the impression that FBI field offices independently decide when to share information and with whom at the local and state levels. Respondents acknowledged the support from the Department of Homeland Security with DHS assigned analysts; however, the lack of FBI sharing or partnerships with their fusion centers led them to believe information sharing by the FBI was still a challenge.

This information was further validated during private discussions with the author in July and August of 2009 with experts who confirmed that FBI field offices primarily determined information sharing policies with local and state partners and chief executives. A key example is in the current design of the system-based information sharing concepts at the local and state level that forces contribution to the FBI system, rather than enabling information exchanges between other national and local systems. If fusion or crime analysts

want to see FBI information, they must use the FBI's Guardian or LEO programs rather than using information from a multi-source system integrated with local law enforcement's information system architecture.

Responses were mixed about the process for giving feedback to fusion centers. One respondent who expressed satisfaction with the services and products said no feedback was ever necessary because it met their expectation; however, it was this respondent that also indicated that he needed to request for additional information on other topics, suggesting that, at least in this case, there were still some executive needs not being fulfilled. A number of respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with the information received did not go into details about providing feedback. One respondent suggested that the number of questions asked during the briefing or in response to a product should be indicative of their feedback on the service and product.

All respondents except for two were emphatic of their desire to receive classified information. These respondents said that it mattered to them that briefings included classified information because they believed classified information meant a higher level of detail. A respondent said, "how do I know what I don't know?" However, responses revealed that even when they received such information, they have been unimpressed with the level of detail considered classified. The majority of respondents suggested that the lack of useful information in classified material was the result of the lack of collaboration or information sharing from the federal intelligence community with their fusion centers. The majority of respondents also noted anecdotally that the Top Secret classification of information made it impossible for those that have Secret level clearance to receive the intelligence. The majority of respondents also indicated concern with the federal control of access to intelligence which suggested the federal effort did not support the *National Strategy for Information Sharing*.

D. IMPACT ON EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING

Interviews show that there is a lack of relevancy to the executive's perspective and threshold of interest in the information provided through fusion center services and products. In general, respondents felt that fusion center's perspectives and appreciation for the executive-level operating environment were very limited. The evident lack of fusion center insight and foresight concerning the executive's operating environment makes it impossible to provide information relevant to the decision-making needs of the executive.

The majority of respondents noted that intelligence analysis should yield specific information that could help them make recommendations to the executive (e.g., adjustment of resources for agencies; identify and change existing policies; mitigate vulnerability in identified area). One respondent felt that the fusion center should provide a long-term threat assessment so that the annual strategic planning and budgeting process could be better informed resulting in resources appropriately distributed. However, the same respondent noted that gaps existed between threat assessments and resource expenditures. The example given was the need for threat assessments to determine the level of budgeting required for personnel deployment for a planned event. The respondent said that threat assessments indicated no increased risk or concerns. Yet, several months after the planned event, the personnel costs associated with security deployment for the event were significantly higher than in the past and had no correlation to the earlier threat assessment. This type of threat assessment is irrelevant to the executive and may erode credibility of information developed in the future and the fusion center.

Several respondents mentioned the previous overseas attacks on civilian locations (e.g., Mumbai; Islamabad) and said the briefings and information received from the fusion center were already available through open sources. They wanted to know about the terrorist tactics and strategies employed to understand how their local security posture could be improved throughout the

jurisdiction. One respondent said after an initial briefing on the Mumbai attacks, the executive asked for further briefings because the Mumbai incident had strong resonance to their metropolitan area.

According to several private conversations with colleagues, immediately following an attack (domestic and foreign), most sources (other than the news) reduce the level of information sharing because of ongoing investigations and lack of corroboration. This makes it problematic for fusion centers to meet the needs and demands of local and state chief executives who require immediate development of information to understand the security risks to their region. Additional information revealed that FBI field offices' approach to information sharing with local and state law entities are dependent on the personality of the field office leadership and the culture of the FBI personnel. Generally, it is difficult to obtain information from FBI personnel because they do not want to share it with non-law enforcement individuals.

Another respondent suggested that their executive could be integral to communicating key risk and crisis information to the public and wanted their fusion center to generate information for the public, private sector and government employees so that they could be made aware of hazards and be prepared to respond or take precautions. If the public knew what was being done with the information collected, this form of transparency could help decrease civil liberties concerns that the government had nefarious intentions.

E. IMPROVING FUSION CENTER VALUE

The majority of respondents articulated the need for fusion centers to improve the products and to improve the fusion center's value to chief executives. Measures include improving content through jurisdictional relevancy, analytical insights, cultural and multi-disciplinary context, identifying a trusted briefer to the executive, helping the executive maintain a knowledge and decision advantage, providing him or her with distilled intelligence relevant to decision making, and developing risk information and crisis management.

Fusion centers should distinguish themselves from the 24-hour public media. Fusion center products and services value can be significantly improved if senior personnel and fusion center analysts are educated on the intelligence cycle. The quality of intelligence developed by fusion centers would be improved through the education of chief executives and senior personnel concerning the intelligence development process, including an executive requirements session and getting executive involvement throughout the intelligence process.

Executives are not educated in the intelligence cycle. Either they do not know what to expect from intelligence, or their expectations are too high. Meanwhile, it is difficult to address what their intelligence support requirements are. Because of this lack of education, fusion center personnel should work with trusted senior personnel (executive staffs, senior advisors, heads of law enforcement, homeland security advisors, emergency management directors, chiefs of staff, public safety directors, etc.) who, by default, hold the responsibility of engaging their fusion centers. Ultimately, these individuals can identify the potential policy and support needs of their chief executive to help guide fusion centers.

The senior level staffs also play a critical role in determining when to brief their mayor or governor. These trusted senior level personnel either serve as the firewall that prevents direct engagement of the executive or serve as the conduits of engagement for fusion centers. The coaching process involved in guiding the fusion center in the production of tailored briefings will help build trust between the briefer and the consumer. When a comfort level is achieved, the trusted senior personnel can become the conduit for setting up opportunities with the executive for fusion center briefings. The more fusion center analysts learn about executive style, preference, and interests through senior personnel, the more they can be prepared to provide the right level of intelligence briefing or product meeting the executive's needs.

Fusion centers and federal partners should also address classification issues, specifically the accessibility of classified information and the ability to

share it with local and state chief executives when appropriate. It is clear through the interview responses that local and state executives believe their knowledge advantage suffers when federal partners withhold information. Recognizing that classified information shared by federal agencies can only be sanitized or downgraded by the federal agency providing the original product, local and state officials are reliant on the “owner” of the information to declassify and share with them. Private conversations with experts reveal that tear-lines³ are rarely included in classified documents produced by federal partners for are not developed in a manner timely enough to share with local and state partners. Opportunities to know about valuable tactical and strategic information may be missed by local law enforcement and public safety partners (Homeland Security Information Network, 2007). Thus, it is imperative that federal partners declassify or provide tear-lines in the classified materials so that they can share with local and state partners.

Writing for release⁴ or development of an executive level sensitive product for chief executives with no Secret level security clearance should be prudent under current classification policies. For Top Secret classified information, federal partners in fusion centers should be able to provide fusion analysts with pertinent releasable information while preserving Top Secret level classification with appropriate handling instructions. This “write for release” is an approach that fusion analysts should adopt when they develop their intelligence analysis for executives.

F. CONCLUSION

This interview summary provides insight that was previously silent on executive perspective and engagement of their fusion centers. From the group

³ Tear-lines provide delineation on classified documents of sensitive source content and/or intelligence sources and methods. They allow receipt of modified products when the sensitive source above the tear-line is retained by the producer (McConnell, 2007).

⁴ Writing for release is the practice of drafting a document based on classified sources in such a way as to facilitate a favorable decision on its release at lowered classification level, or at the unclassified level to support intelligence sharing.

of senior level respondents, this researcher uncovered that the majority of chief executives are not regularly engaging with and are not finding satisfaction with their fusion centers. While the ideal of a fusion center remains high, the real value of their fusion center seems low. One of the reasons respondents believe contributes to the lack of engagement is the fusion center's lack of awareness of the role of chief executives, especially the high-profile nature of their roles in responding to crises and emergencies. Ultimately, mayors and governors are accountable for local preparedness, response, and mitigation of events regardless of the nature of threats and events. The next section addresses the role of mayors and governors as leaders of their jurisdictions, their need for situational awareness, knowledge and decision advantages, the importance of conveying risk and crisis communications to the public, and the significant role that trusts plays in the information chief executives receive.

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V. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY

In the complex world of homeland security, where the confluence of security and emerging threats often intersect and collide with politics and limited resources, leaders often find themselves engulfed in a maelstrom of activities that require their ability to understand the context in which they find themselves and to adjust their actions accordingly. Under the shadow of global and domestic threats and faced with local challenges and uncertainties, mayors and governors are frontline homeland security defenders who need a full suite of tools and information to help them understand the complex operating environment within their jurisdictions.

Feedback from the exploratory interviews yielded useful insights such as a general sense that fusion centers did not understand the information needs of mayors and governors as decision makers. Consequently, fusion center products lack relevancy and utility to the day-to-day executive operating environment.

This chapter on executive accountability provides insights to the role and needs of chief executives, their methods and measures for developing daily situational awareness and sense making, the public scrutiny and challenges they face during crises and emergencies as the highest profile elected official, and the significance of trust in developing credibility with stakeholders.

A. ROLE OF MAYORS AND GOVERNORS

As key leaders and as the top elected official of their jurisdictions, mayors and governors are under constant pressure to deliver efficient and effective government services and actions. From ensuring that potholes are filled, swimming pools are safe and accessible, and 911 calls are answered, to providing quality healthcare, public school education, and public safety, chief executives bear the primary responsibility for managing limited resources, shaping public policies, and addressing constituent concerns on a daily basis.

Chief executives are responsible to taxpayers for equitable distribution of tax revenue and ensuring that basic government services are delivered in the most efficient, effective, and timely manner. Executives are also under constant public scrutiny and pressure, which is evident in each election cycle, and in the local daily news media that are constantly alert to opportunities to expose waste, fraud, and abuses of the government. Performance indicators such as crime statistics, educational test scores, neighborhood blight, traffic management, customer services, fire and EMS responses, and 911 call-dispatches are also measures of executive performance. Gathering these indicators and making them public is a form of transparency and accountability that many local and state governments provide to the public.

As the key decision maker for their jurisdictions, mayors and governors rely on sense making based on the best set of information available to them. Aside from performance indicators noted in the previous paragraph, chief executives have situational awareness methods that help them identify the weak areas that need attention or the bureaucratic chokepoints for correction. Some methods employed by executives to maintain situational awareness include regular meetings with trusted staff to review issues, services or operations.

As noted in Chapter I, chief executives leverage information through their staff on a daily basis, drawing from the staff's analysis of policies, operations, budgets, the political landscape, the media, and community issues. Executives use that knowledge to assess perceptions of government performance, while providing their staff with feedback on what more they want to know about or understand. With keen political perspective, mayors and governors are astute at identifying the context of situations and adjusting their behavior, decisions, and actions to address or adapt to the circumstances with which they are presented. For chief executives, this includes understanding the issues at stake, working collaboratively with stakeholders and key players, and deciding when to get involved.

B. NEED FOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, KNOWLEDGE, AND DECISION ADVANTAGES

Interviews revealed that mayors and governors expect their staffs to know everything that is occurring in their jurisdictions and hold staffs responsible for informing them on issues when needed. Chief executives, depending on personal interests and style, employ various methods, tools, and staff to keep abreast of as many issues as possible. In the absence of certainty and often constrained by time, the executive relies on the ability to know as much detail as quickly as possible when events dictate. The mechanisms for staying informed include: daily information and updates by senior staff on legislative issues, economic development, educational issues, agency operations, policy priorities, community issues, crime data, public health indicators, regional and national issues, reliance on tools such as electronic alerts and notifications, analysis of emerging trends, patterns, or anomalies in government performance, and customer service demands. This is not an exhaustive list.

According to interviews with senior staff, the issue areas and level of details required by the executive depends on the priorities and interests of the executive, as well as the emergency or crisis of the day. The executive's prioritizing process, therefore, is dynamic and dependent on real-time information. This demand for situational awareness helps the executive understand the context in which he or she must operate or lead and provides the executive opportunities to adapt when necessary. In the absence of such information and confronted with knowledge shortfalls and uncertainties, the executive does not want to be forced into making decisions. Situational awareness and sense making are important to an executive's effective management of risks, crises, and public trust, especially in high threat and high population density urban areas. These regions experience a variety of man-caused and natural hazards, while remaining top terrorist targets. Interview participants spoke of the need for each of their chief executive to have awareness of terrorism threats relevant to their jurisdictions. The examples of

Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and former New York State Governor George Pataki, in their measured public response to the transatlantic plot in 2006 involving airplanes, represented the importance of situational awareness and sense making to them as chief executives managing risks and the public trust.

However, no respondents who had positive interactions with their fusion center services and products were explicit in how the information contributed to shaping policies, planning, and budgeting. Without examples, this may suggest that fusion center products and services have minimal to no impact. For those that had less positive interactions, one respondent addressed the need to have lessons learned from real incidents and actionable information for the executive.

In interviews senior staff pointed to the importance of their executive being informed in advance of negative developments by federal authorities as a courtesy and respect for the mayor or governor's position as the jurisdiction's chief executive. Detailed information helps the executive and his agencies to identify the resources to support the preparedness and response efforts and to keep their constituencies informed, prepared, and, ultimately, safe. In the months after the 9/11 attacks, the lack of coordinated information sharing by federal authorities with localities and states caused many mayors and governors to respond unevenly, ultimately contributing to uncoordinated and costly security defense actions (Belluck & Egan, 2001).

C. IMPORTANCE OF RISK COMMUNICATION

According to Sellnow et al. (2009), the "ultimate goal of effective risk communication is to avoid crises" (p. 4). One of the lessons learned as a result of Hurricane Katrina is the importance of timely risk communications to the public. In the *Failure of Initiative* report by the U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee, the risk of Hurricane Katrina hitting New Orleans was forecasted and well anticipated, as was the potential breaching of the levee (H.R. Rpt. No. 109–377, 2006). Yet, local, state, and federal officials failed to coordinate their planning and preparations for the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, and they failed

to effectively communicate the following to the public: the risks involved in sheltering in place during a Category 5 hurricane, the potential breach of the levee, and the effect of the aftermath of this once in a lifetime event (S. Rep. No. 109–322, 2006). The crises post-Katrina was further exacerbated by the lack of leadership and multi-agency collaboration in managing critically needed resources for the affected communities.

Public dissatisfaction in government officials was especially high after the hurricane (Pew, 2005). It is an understatement to say that mayors and governors do not want to repeat the failures associated with Hurricane Katrina. It is also a mistake to believe that mayors and governors alone could have prevented the failures of Hurricane Katrina. Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly suggest in *Megacommunities* that in an interdependent world, the megacommunity consisting of governments, businesses, and communities must work together to manage complexities and challenges (2008). In order to collectively prepare and respond, information about risks and consequences needs to be shared so that actions can be developed.

According to Sellnow et al., effective risk communication facilitates risk sharing between officials and with the community and offers a collaborative approach to addressing shared risks (2009). Fusion centers in high threat, high population density urban areas should be used to help mayors and governors understand their jurisdictional and operating risks for significant events and threats. Fusion centers in major urban areas are uniquely positioned to draw upon federal, state, local, and private sector participants for collaboration in developing risk assessments, situational awareness, and intelligence based on analysis of information from all sources. A central premise in performing multi-agency risk assessments should be that the findings would ultimately be shared with the public.

Executives appreciate the opportunity to frame issues before the media takes control. There is also the challenge of knowing what risk information to share while avoiding mass panic or when information is not useful, resulting in a

lack of public response. One interview respondent felt that fusion centers, in identifying patterns leading to a potential threat, would be able to provide the executive with risk information that can be shared with the public before an incident, if possible, rather than solely focus on the crisis messaging after an incident. Wray, Rivers, Whitworth, Jupka, and Clements found that successful government risk communications depend on the public's confidence in the government (2006). A way to building the public trust in government should be to build a mutual dialogue and a risk-sharing, decision-making process with the public. Sellnow et al. argue the need for the government to maintain honest and open communication with the public before, during, and after the crisis (2009). This gives credibility and legitimacy during a time of uncertainty and allows the executive to establish a higher level of trust with the public.

Alleviation of fear, anxiety, and confusion among the public are also significant factors motivating mayors and governors to embrace an effective risk communication strategy. Research by the National Academy of Sciences suggests developing risk communication before an event as a way to minimize the psychological consequences of terrorism and other traumatic events (2003). It is also a way to build a resilient culture that can withstand the long-term effects. Much like the childhood lessons of "stop, drop, and roll" when on fire, appropriate risk messaging mentally equips and trains the individual to be able to prevent or proactively respond in ways that gives the individual control of his or her situation. Instead of informing the public that they are on their own for the first 72 hours of a natural disaster or large scale incident, perhaps government policies and preparedness actions should emphasize the empowerment of individuals and communities by involving them in the development of local preparations, solutions, and decisions (Bach & Kaufmann, 2009).

Psychology research has shown that when people are self sufficient, believe they can control their situations, and adapt to changes, they are more resilient (Bongar et al., 2007). Additionally, government leaders need to be culturally sensitive to special needs communities (e.g., seniors, indigent, minority,

and immigrant communities) and to craft risk communication messages through conduits that are best received by such communities (e.g., nursing homes, shelters, health care aides, religious, cultural, and ethnic representatives, and the media). Traditionally, emergency management agencies are responsible for risk identification and contingency planning. In major urban cities, emergency management agencies should consider closely integrating with fusion centers so that they could play a significant role in developing and coordinating information to assist these communities.

D. IMPORTANCE OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION

Interviews revealed that improved fusion center value would be achieved by providing chief executives with information to communicate to the public that would reduce concerns generated by uncertainty. The goals of terrorism include provoking widespread fear, insecurity, and changed behaviors of government, the public and private sectors. Without adequate crisis communication, the goals of terrorism may be easily achieved (Breckinridge & Zimbardo, 2007).

Oftentimes, the public remembers the visible presence of mayors and governors during crises. One of the lessons learned from the September 11 attacks was the importance of public visibility and messaging conveyed by then New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani. While he may not have had the opportunity to communicate risk information of the terrorists attacks because no local and state executive was privy to that information, held by the federal intelligence community, Giuliani's ubiquitous presence after the attacks reassured a nervous public that he was in charge of the city (Purnick, 2001). This type of phenomenon is noted by sociologist Max Weber that people who follow leaders during crises demonstrate "a devotion born of distress and enthusiasm" (1968, p. 23). Former Los Angeles City Mayor Richard Riordan also explained the role of mayors during crises as "99% showmanship" because people want to see their leaders (Zahniser & Willon, 2008). With similar sentiment, Washington, DC Mayor Adrian Fenty declared the importance of being "omnipresent and visible" in the

community (Ifill, 2009, p. 229). The high visibility of these mayors may help to reduce concerns during uncertainties, but it is their efforts to communicate clearly early on and to mobilize people, communities, and organizations for positive collaborative actions that mitigates fear during crises and helps build community resiliency.

Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger noted the importance of crisis communication to crisis management (2006). This includes communication within organizations, externally with other organizations, and with the public. After a crisis or terrorist attack, communication with the public can reduce negative post-traumatic stress (Breckinridge & Zimbardo, 2007; Burke & Cooper, 2008). Mayors and governors who appear on site after a crisis seek to reassure the public that there will be resolution. The corporate world has shown that executive level involvement in crisis communications is a familiar characteristic (O'Donnell, 2009). For example, the CEO of Odwalla food company was directly involved in the public messaging and product recall of tainted apple juice in 1996, and the CEO of Jet Blue airlines publicly apologized for stranding passengers on several planes waiting on the tarmac for 9 hours and issued a passenger's bill of rights in 2007 ("Jet Blue Cancels Flights," 2007).

Crisis communications within organizations and outside of organizations have also been explored. Walter, Hall, and Hobfoll suggest that there are psychological effects to organizational behavior during and after a crisis (2008). They maintain that after a mass casualty event or terrorist attack, organizations can play a significant role for the community and employees. This includes having emergency response and continuity of operations plans in place so that staff know what to do during uncertainties, that their families are safe, and so that individuals can empower themselves. The authors assert that organizations that are adaptive to such incidents can help reduce negative post-traumatic stress and can provide the public the sense of security, certainty, and normalcy after suffering trauma and disruption to their routines (Walter, Hall, & Hobfoll, 2008).

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF TRUST

Public trust is also important for mayors and governors. When they communicate risk information, chief executives want the public to heed their advice and or follow instructions. According to the *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, qualitative research findings in “Public Perceptions about Trust in Emergency Risk Communication” reflect that the public wants information from government officials that is candid, accurate, and useful (Wray, Rivers, Whitworth, Jupka, & Clements, 2006). According to a recent national survey on disaster experiences and preparedness cited in the *Homeland Security Affairs Journal*, a large majority of Americans are paying attention to terrorist threats but do not trust what the government tells them (Bach & Kaufmann, 2009). One way to address this trust gap is to engage the community similar to how public health experts do when they educate the public to identify signs and symptoms so that the public is collectively involved in the response and feels empowered (Bach & Kaufmann, 2009).

Collaborative trust with other partners (e.g., federal, state, regional, private industry, non-government organizations) is also significant. In the days after the September 11 attacks, mayors and governors were either not informed, or not given actionable intelligence by the federal government, on potential terrorists threats (Belluck & Egan, 2001). According to interviews with senior staff, sharing of information by the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities with localities and states has improved since 9/11, but significant efforts need to be made to improve timeliness and to make sharing less restrictive. A private discussion with a senior official highlighted that a form of information trading occurs among local, state, and federal authorities out of necessity rather than information sharing based on trust or responsibility to share.

Relationship trust is a critical element for chief executives and their senior staff. The exploratory research revealed that chief executives relied on their senior personnel to determine when briefings and intelligence are needed. Such

designated or self-identified intermediaries address the engagement gap between chief executives and fusion centers; however, interviews reveal that chief executives are still not receiving adequate information for knowledge and decision advantages. Fusion centers suffer without executive direction and oversight of their activities.

Trust in information presented is essential to providing the executive with a knowledge and decision advantage. The executive must be able to rely on information that is credible and legitimately developed or risk losing the public trust in the institution, and how information is obtained and shared. The most recent example of a loss in credibility by a fusion center is the exposure of the Texas Fusion Center's issuance of a "Prevention Awareness Bulletin," stating the importance of law enforcement officials to report "activities of lobbying groups, Muslim civil rights organizations and anti-war protest groups in their areas" ("Fusion Center Encourages Improper," 2009). This reporting without a criminal predicate demonstrates a lack of sensitivity towards free speech activities and is an affront to the basic rights of Americans. Covey suggested that the lack of trust could be costly, inefficient within organizations and collaboration, and disastrous for interpersonal relationships (2006).

F. CONCLUSION

Chief executives in high-risk urban areas desire situational awareness and knowledge and decision advantages. This information helps them gauge and calibrate appropriate planning, operational, and public responses. They are astute in recognizing that their public appearances at high-profile incidents and events is often a way to communicate their accountability to the public. However, chief executives should also recognize that the public wants to trust the information it receives, be better informed, be prepared, and to be engaged as a trusted partner and not simply to receive directions from the government. How do mayors and governors engage the citizenry and ensure that resources are

being directed appropriately? The next chapter will address the realities that chief executives face as the first line of defense against terrorism and other local threats and how fusion centers can better support them.

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VI. AVOIDING STRATEGIC SURPRISE/EXAMINING THE REALITIES

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Conference of Mayors released its security action plan, calling attention to the two “wars” in which mayors of large cities found themselves engaged: one against terrorism and the threats to their communities, and the other, economic survival (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 2001). Nearly eight years after the 9/11 attacks and a global recession, localities and states continue to be at the forefront of fighting the dual wars, while also fighting violent crime, natural and man-made disasters, and a pandemic flu. Perrow (1999) and Cooper Ramo (2009) perceptively noted that individuals are exposed to more crises than ever before because of advancing technologies, interdependencies, and an integrated global community. With fewer resources and more security demands, chief executives must not only be innovative in their planning but also presciently strategize for the future.

Feedback from the exploratory interviews yielded insights regarding the chief executives’ lack of understanding for their role in the intelligence development cycle. Chief executives desire to use fusion center developed intelligence to help inform the homeland security program development, the annual strategic planning and budgeting process, and how limited resources can be optimized through prudent security planning. This chapter focuses on how fusion centers can support mayors and governors by adding value, taking advantage of critical opportunities, and providing strategic decision-making advantages to them.

A. HOW RAW ALL-SOURCES INFORMATION BECOMES VALUE-ADDED INTELLIGENCE FOR MAYORS AND GOVERNORS

One of the value propositions of fusion centers is to provide top executives with knowledge and decision-making advantages. Satisfaction of this value proposition is in part developed through the intelligence cycle at fusion centers.

Yet, according to Rollins (2008), the intelligence cycle is rarely followed in fusion centers. Based on interview responses, the belief is that fusion centers are passing along information that is not necessarily based on a defined customer need; it is not analyzed or distilled for relevancy, and not tailored in any engaging way to the customer's interest.

Intelligence experts believe that intelligence is uniquely different from raw information that most consumers receive. Lowenthal asserts that information is what is known, regardless of the source, and may be unvetted and unconfirmed, and that intelligence is the information that "meets the stated or understood needs of the policy maker and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs" (2006, p. 2).

Based on interview responses, it appears that mayors and governors are not using intelligence as other federal counterpart policy makers who have been using intelligence to support their policies and decisions. Specifically, interviews revealed that fusion center intelligence does not meet the executive's needs. As noted in Chapter IV, local and state executives are not engaging directly with their fusion centers, which handicaps fusion centers in identifying policy areas or issues of executive interest. Interview respondents believed that fusion centers should know and anticipate the needs and desires of the executive. Lowenthal (2006) and Gookins (2008) note that this is a common belief of senior policy makers.

Once the executive or his or her senior personnel has identified his or her intelligence requirements, fusion centers should identify what sources exist that already provide relevant data and information. Many of these data streams and information sources already exist in some form in the government, although sometimes the difficulty in obtaining the data and information lies with legal and policy restrictions and to a lesser degree, technological barriers.

The executive should be involved in stressing the importance of information sharing within his government and in affirming and establishing clear privacy and civil liberties guidelines. Without strong and sustained oversight, abuses may occur. A recent example is the 2008 Maryland State Police surveillance of activists subsequently determined to be acting well within their First Amendment rights (Jackson, 2008). This particular incident drew unwanted attention to the executive who was unaware of the state's intelligence activity. It also suggests that intelligence requirements for collecting information on activists were established by an entity that did not understand the executive level's need to know that this activity was being conducted and the political ramifications of not having executive and legal oversight.

The majority of interviews confirm that chief executives do not believe they are receiving value-added analysis, synthesis, and forward looking intelligence from their fusion centers. Respondents mentioned that the content of the fusion center products on foreign terrorist attacks is not presented in such a way to be relevant to the local government's needs. For example, after the 2008 Islamabad, Pakistan attack,⁵ a flurry of various briefing products and situational alerts were sent to customers by fusion centers. But those products more often than not failed to provide assessments of the potential implications for the locality or state. A number of interview respondents mentioned getting detailed and updated information from CNN and other news media after the attack, suggesting that the news media had more insights than the information from their own fusion center. However, even after receiving fusion center materials, respondents were not given insight to a foreign attack's implications for the local jurisdiction. New York Police Department's (NYPD) NYPD Shield provides an example of an effective briefing model that points out to the reader what the implications of foreign or domestic events are to New York City.

⁵ Suicide bomb attack by an explosive-filled dump truck occurred in front of the Marriott Hotel on September 20, 2008. Attack occurred few hours after new President Asif Ali Zardari made first speech to parliament and was during the Ramadan breakfast. The hotel was adjacent to government buildings near Parliament, the President's house, and the Marriott is a popular locale for foreigners and diplomats (Robertson & Vergee, 2008).

The one respondent that was unimpressed with the NYPD Shield product noted that the information is traditionally entirely drawn from open sources and, therefore, was not “intelligence” as defined by Lowenthal (2006). Thus, value-added intelligence would have been in the form of information regarding the political circumstances leading up to the attack, potential similarities to the executive’s jurisdiction, any recommendations for contacting the hotel association, private security groups, and identification of any known threats or patterns suggesting an attack.

In providing the political circumstances, the executive can be made aware which high-profile political figure is in or traveling through the area or if election locations should have increased security. In identifying potential similarities, what made the targeted area so attractive, and the attack so successful, may be compared to the executive’s jurisdiction to determine if preventive measures are warranted. In recommending immediate actions, chief executives can build on or develop their relationships with private entities such as hotel owners, management, security simply by calling and offering to work together to ensure the safety of their customers, business preservation, and thereby the preservation of the jurisdiction’s lodging, tourists, and business tax base. In identifying known threats and patterns, these are opportunities for the chief executive to reflect on the planning and budgeting of resources and activities in training, response, and mitigation.

Absent the value-added intelligence and linkages that are desired by local and state chief executives, who are usually under scrutiny as the highest-profile elected leaders, Tier 1 UASI located fusion centers are missing opportunities to take advantage of the elevated levels of attention, interest, and support after a major incident. They are also failing to build value through their inaction just when chief executives are ripe for engagement. The next section explores when executives are engaged and how executive offices can leverage those opportunities to develop a strategic decision-making advantage.

B. DEVELOPING THE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING ADVANTAGE

There is generally one period each year when every large city and state executive office will be engaged in a sustained amount of their time and energy developing, framing, and negotiating on how resources are used in the next year. That period is known as the annual budget development process. Each year, the annual budget also becomes the major policy doctrine for cities and states. As the chief executive, mayors and governors shape, develop and execute the policies and strategic business plan for their jurisdictions. Because every locality and state has limited resources, a critical component to allocating finite resources is in the prioritizing of the executive's policy interests, particularly during the budget development process. The process includes robust reviews, examination, and public hearings; executive engagement in negotiations with the legislative branch and identification of trade offs that each can agree. This strategic planning process results in the policies and budget to be implemented the following fiscal year.




Figure 2. Budget Development Cycle

As seen in Figure 2, the budget development process involves many steps. The strategic planning process is a political, considered, and collaborative approach that is hierarchical (Bryson, 2004). These strategic budgets are developed through lengthy planning and robust examination of service delivery, effective business processes, and measured against desired outcomes and outputs. During the course of such extensive executive reviews, agency stakeholders have the opportunity to engage city and state leadership in examining previous service performance and to make adjustments to the policy, program, or budget as necessary. This process requires the stakeholders and the leadership to be politically astute, rational, and be able to make sound

decisions that are meaningful to their jurisdiction (Bryson, 2004). Thus, mayors and governors are usually informed through this process of the revenue they can anticipate, performance results of existing services, and the unintentional effects of previous policies or new dynamics of a technologically advanced and integrated world.

However, while this budget development process involves many steps, it is also limited because of the hierarchical presumptions of how strategy unfolds. Strategic planning and budgeting is usually developed with the strong belief that an anticipated future environment will not change. The budget cycle in Figure 2 shows the limitations of strategic planning: anticipated annual revenue estimates; defined agency services; performance and costs of service delivery; and political tradeoffs. While this is conducive to traditional hierarchical strategic planning, it is not conducive to adapting to changes in circumstances. For example, a crisis on the scale of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was not factored into the local, state, and federal strategic planning process. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Conference of Mayors released their security action plan, calling attention to the two “wars” in which mayors of large cities found themselves engaged: one against terrorism and the threats to their communities, and the other, economic survival (USCM, 2001). The effects are realized in the current federal homeland security grant program, which almost all jurisdictions rely on exclusively for their homeland security programs (National Emergency Management Association, 2007); a new Department of Homeland Security based on reorganization of existing but reluctant functions and agencies; and a multilevel security posture that does not appear to be sustainable or adaptable given the economic downturn.

Instead of forcing government agencies to compete for limited resources and to maintain a stovepipe agency focus, mayors and governors should consider embracing a distribution of responsibility approach where non-government partners such as the private sector, academia, religious, and civic

organizations, and individuals share the responsibility in identifying service needs and resources to efficiently meet those needs.

Fusion centers could potentially help mayors and governors distribute responsibility between the government, community, and private sector partners. Fusion centers that collaborate with private sector partners may have established relationships that mayors and governors can build upon. They may be best positioned to: identify the private and public partners that will help mitigate risks and emerging threats, engage the private sector for their capabilities and customer service expertise, and develop risk communications for mayors and governors to foster citizen information sharing and community preparedness.

Chief executives would greatly benefit from analysis, insights, and actionable intelligence from fusion centers. They would also benefit from the network value of effective fusion centers, both in enlarging the scope of information, intelligence, and analyses and achieving collaborative insight and assistance to decision making. Through networks, effective fusion centers can add value to chief executives' strategic decision-making advantage by providing them with useful intelligence they need and that is relevant to their role. It should also provide mayors and governors with greater flexibility for adapting to changes and anticipate surprises. As a dynamic process, consistent fusion center briefings and engagement may help chief executives better calibrate their policy decisions throughout the year rather than deal with changing circumstances like a global recession, shrinking tax base, and security needs a year in advance during the time sensitive budget development cycle with limited intelligence.

C. USING INTELLIGENCE TO INFORM STRATEGIC PLANNING

As discussed earlier, mayors and governors are informed through the strategic planning and budget development process by the revenue they anticipate, performance results of existing services, and the unintentional effects of previous policies or new technology. One interview respondent noted a desire to have fusion centers provide intelligence products to inform the strategic

planning process. Financial experts provide this information to governments in the form of the revenue estimates based on tax receipts. They monitor economic trends of the past and draw conclusions based on global, national, and sometimes local, activities to explain the context for the revenue estimates (Nathan, 2008). Some of these activities include policies enacted by the administration to raise more revenue, e.g.: increases to the tax base through funding or initiatives to improving public school achievements, lowered crime rates through increases in police officers or targeted efforts in crime hot spots, etc.

Through their analysis of the outcomes achieved or intended outcomes, financial analysts will continuously revise and update their revenue estimates throughout the year. Once revenue estimates have been revealed, they are used by the executives as the basis for framing discussions on future policies, programs, and spending by the government. Depending on the methodologies used in forecasting, some revenue estimates can also be contentious (Rabin, 2003). Nevertheless, financial estimates are adjusted periodically, and at the predetermined period in developing the following year's budget, serve as the executive's basis for the annual strategic planning process.

Comparable to the revenue estimates process, the federal National Intelligence Council produces National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) that are considered the intelligence community's most authoritative written assessment for policy makers. These NIEs are not without controversy. The most notable NIE was issued in 2002 on Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which led to the Iraq War and the demise of Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, the NIE was politically manipulated by policy makers as justification for the Iraq War.

At the local, regional, and state levels, fusion centers produce threat assessments for their jurisdictions. Some produce them on a regular basis while others provide them for special events. Fusion center threat assessments have also been under scrutiny. The Virginia Fusion Center's threat assessment in 2009 was criticized for its analysis on educational and religious institutions as

breeding grounds for terrorist activities. The appearance of intruding on the First Amendment rights of Virginians was quickly addressed by the Virginia governor in the announcement of an investigation into the “methodologies and process” involved in producing the report (Kaine, 2009). This response by the chief executive suggests that the intelligence requirements were established by an entity that was not politically astute enough to inform the executive, and did not recognize the complex operating environment the executive must lead.

As noted in Chapter IV, insights from the author’s exploratory interviews revealed that fusion centers are not able to produce local threat assessments very well. The lack of relevancy to the jurisdiction, lack of timeliness, and lack of actionable intelligence make their generic products overall unsatisfactory to executives.

Lowenthal outlines three critical factors for intelligence (2006). He asserts that intelligence helps to avoid strategic surprise, provides for long-term intelligence expertise to term-limited chief executives, and supports the policy development process. At the first annual National Fusion Center Conference, Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security advised participants that intelligence is viewed as “an early warning system that allows public safety officials to get a jump on the adversary” (Rollins, 2008, p. 5). The *National Strategy for Information Sharing* (White House, 2007) outlines five uses of information: (1) prevention of terrorist attacks; (2) critical infrastructure protection and resilience planning; (3) prioritizing management, response, and recovery to crises; (4) develop training and exercises; and (5) allocation of resources.

The potential of fusion centers is in their ability to provide intelligence that can help the executive better understand the security risks and vulnerabilities in communities. This helps chief executives make informed decisions, build in resources to allow adaptability, and identify the level of political capital necessary during budget negotiations with the legislative branch. Ultimately, the better the

executive is able to grasp this information, the better informed he or she will be in developing policies, budgeting and planning to prioritize investments in addressing security risks and vulnerabilities.

D. IMPACT OF CLASSIFIED AND “NEED TO KNOW” INFORMATION ON LOCAL AND STATE EXECUTIVES

The majority of respondents were concerned with the classification of materials that prevent their timely review or prevent their sharing of the information with people who are not cleared to receive it. Several examples from the interviews revealed a disturbing reality of how some federal authorities are still unable to accept local and state authorities as partners in information sharing. One respondent recounted a nationwide gathering of non-federal senior personnel representing their jurisdiction with a cabinet secretary and was told they would receive a Top Secret classified briefing; yet only a handful were able to attend because of their security clearance level. Another senior level respondent noted that because he was not cleared to receive Secret level classified information, he was prevented from receiving classified information. A third respondent indicated that a request for information by their fusion center was rebuffed by the FBI field office because there was not a “need to know” for the locality or state. These responses suggest that federal authorities are still in control of intelligence and local and state executives cannot designate senior personnel to represent their interest unless they are cleared by the federal security clearance process, approved by the federal government to handle sensitive federal information, and deemed by the FBI to have a “need to know” for the information requested.

With the establishment of over 70 fusion centers, localities and states attempted to find their own solution to the lack of federal intelligence sharing. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the national efforts to change the federal level information sharing paradigm from “need to know” to “responsibility to share” has not been as effective from the local and state perspective. Even with

the release of the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* document in 2007, the treatment of and trust displayed toward local and state partners has been mixed.

Respondents revealed in Chapter IV their suspicions that FBI field offices were reluctant to share information with local and state officials who were not law enforcement, and additional private conversations with individuals validated those suspicions. If FBI field offices continue to challenge local and state officials in preserving their “need to know” perspective rather than the “responsibility to share,” it remains to be seen if there will be a true paradigm shift as called for in the 2004 *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks*, 2004 *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act*, 2007 NSIS, and most recently, the 2008 *U.S. Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy*.

Although the NSIS addresses the need for local and state officials to access information to protect their communities and acknowledges that localities and states are “often best able to identify potential threats that exist within their jurisdictions,” its lack of progress demonstrates the hollowness of federal level partnership, prevents effective collaboration, and erodes trust (White House, 2007, p. 3).

The need for secrecy and sensitivity of information sources and methods is understandably important to national security, and there is no argument for sharing sources and methods with state and local partners. At a basic level, the federal classification system, the federal control of access to it, and when it can be accessed is perceived by local and state officials as a form of distrust in localities and states and a lack of appreciation for their frontline role in securing the nation, which further widens the trust gap between the federal government and local and state executives.

E. CONCLUSION

Chief executives want to avoid surprises and be able to anticipate them. They do this by demanding their staff have situational awareness to avoid strategic surprises. There is also an expectation that federal partners will share information with local and state authorities rather than continue to hide behind the “need to know” philosophy. Only then will fusion centers be able to deliver intelligence, analysis that is relevant, useful, and engaging to mayors and governors information. Ultimately, the consistent dynamic interaction with fusion centers should bring value to chief executives by helping them to calibrate their decisions daily and throughout the year, rather than the rigid once a year strategic budget development process.

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VII. PREPARING THE DECISION MAKER

[Directorate of Intelligence] analysts did not have the foggiest notion of what I did; and I did not have a clue as to what they could or should do. (Blackwill, A Policy Maker's Perspective on intelligence Analysis, 2008, p. 154)

The role of intelligence is to inform the decision-making process, support the policies, and provide knowledge and decision advantages for the policy maker (Gookins, 2008). As noted in Chapter I, the overarching goal of the fusion center should be to help the decision maker prepare for the operating environment of the city or state. When information is credible and relevant to the chief executive, it can be extremely advantageous. Chapter V illuminated the methods and measures that chief executives employ, and the exploratory interviews conducted for this research reveal a desire for situational awareness on issues of executive interest at all times.

Mayors and governors, as the key decision makers for their jurisdictions, demand a set of tools and processes to help them access distilled, relevant information when they want and need it. The private sector does this in ways that allow business executives to identify the most cost efficient and marketable information that helps the business meet the need and demands of their customers. Physicians also use a similar model in the testing and assessments and the health records of patients to identify the right course of action. Another model to review is the Presidential Daily Briefings and the presentations by the Director of National Intelligence. Senior staff personnel play a significant role, based on the interview results, in either serving as the firewall or as a conduit of fusion intelligence for the executive.

The following sections give insight to the Presidential Daily Briefings as an example of the key policy maker involved in the intelligence development process, the role of the DNI and senior personnel, and the decision-making process.

A. PRESIDENTIAL DAILY BRIEFINGS

The Director of Intelligence is the coordinator and approver of the Presidential Daily Briefings (PDB) the President receives. PDBs are summaries of high interest intelligence reports, delivered each working day by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The goal, according to a taped interview with a CIA briefer, is to produce a daily report that is like a current intelligence newspaper (Edwards, 2004). Sometimes the DNI briefings are not decision or action documents, but are new items of intelligence information or updates of a previous briefing or a response to a request. Because of the sensitivity of the classified intelligence, distribution of PDBs are closely controlled and limited to only few policy makers, including the Vice President, Secretary of State, Defense Secretary, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the FBI Director, National Security Council, etc. (Edwards, 2004).

On a daily basis, the President is directly engaged with the IC through the DNI and receives continuous input from his intelligence officer. Prior to the establishment of the DNI in 2005 and U.S. intelligence reforms, daily intelligence summaries were provided to the President and his advisors beginning in the Kennedy Presidency (Kovar, 2007). These were compiled as a direct result of the executive's need for readable summaries tailored from synthesized disparate sources of intelligence that were often duplicative reporting. The PDB and similar briefings continues to evolve with each Presidency based on the President's style, preferences, and interests. The most recent evolution of intelligence briefings is the classified Economic Intelligence Briefing requested by officials in the Obama administration, signaling the need for better understanding of the global economic crisis and its impact (Kingsbury, 2009).

There is historical evidence that each President, except for George H. W. Bush who was CIA director in his earlier career, had to overcome an initial lack of familiarity with intelligence briefings prior to his inauguration (Kovar, 2007). This occurred prior to the inauguration owing to relatively few constraints on the

President-elect's time. Briefers were able to develop briefing relationships and determine style, preference, and interests to engage the primary customer. They also provided insights to incoming Presidents who were curious about current events and their relevancy to the U.S. and U.S. policies. This national intelligence practice of tailoring products focusing on end user satisfaction is a standard practice for how intelligence services support policy makers. This practice is, unfortunately, lacking for local chief executives representing the highest risk Tier 1 UASI areas.

The August 6, 2001 PDB titled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.," represents the most dramatic tension between intelligence to support the policy maker and the course of action to take once the executive has the knowledge and decision advantage. The Bush Administration's claim was that the briefing memo did not provide actionable details ("Transcript," 2004). The President notably said that the briefing did not tell him who, what, where, and when the attacks would occur. The memo attempts to provide the information on the first three questions but does not provide additional details for when the attacks may occur. Local and state executives might ask the same question given this briefing memo. Without actual details and specifics, such as who, what, where, and when, a briefing becomes informational and not an actionable brief. Meanwhile, the role of the briefer could have included sharing the intelligence with other policy makers prior to the President's briefing in order to prepare actionable options for the President and who present those options to him. The next section addresses the role of the Director of National Intelligence.

B. ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Created as a result of the 9/11 Commission recommendations to reform the intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence serves as the nation's top intelligence officer and reports directly to the President. Under the Obama Administration, the President receives an intelligence brief and an economic brief delivered each day by the DNI. The product is a collaborative

effort of the intelligence community and overseen by the DNI (Hosenball, 2009). The *Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004* outlined responsibilities of the DNI, including: the role of primary intelligence briefer to the President and other policy makers; setting the goals and priorities for national intelligence; developing an information-sharing environment; developing the National Intelligence Program budget; working with foreign intelligence services; ensuring accuracy of all sources of intelligence analysis; establishing personnel policies and programs for joint operations and staffing; and working with the Secretary of Defense for purchasing major systems (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d.).

DNI Dennis Blair has sought to approach the top intelligence officer role as a partner with the agencies comprising the intelligence community. His efforts to work with other policy makers to anticipate questions, and develop action steps before the briefings for the President, serve as a good example for preparing briefings for local and state executives. In a recent interview, Blair suggested, “Raw data are of little use unless they can be a foundation for a course of action,” and he further noted that intelligence should be useful to the President (Kingsbury, 2009). To Blair, intelligence should be presented with a defensive and offensive perspective with every analysis on important issues to include both a threat and opportunity section so that the primary executive has the knowledge and decision advantage (Kingsbury, 2009).

Given the demands and needs of local and state chief executives discussed in Chapter V, it behooves them to heed the example of the nation’s Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in setting time each morning to expect and receive critical briefings. Fusion centers should also apply the lessons from DNI Blair in the prescience and anticipation he undertakes in the preparation of intelligence for the decision maker. By receiving a briefing that anticipates the chief executive’s questions and addresses his or her potential concerns, mayors and governors can take the necessary course of action or maintain a knowledge and decision advantage.

C SIGNIFICANCE OF SENIOR STAFF TO CHIEF EXECUTIVES

As noted in Chapter V, chief executives have an impossible to fulfill expectation of knowing everything that is occurring in their jurisdictions. They typically rely on a small group of senior personnel to provide them with "situational awareness." This reliance on staff is based on a level of trust and familiarity that allows for free exchange of information, and a better understanding of the executive's interests, style, and preferences for receiving information. To have information the executive expects ready whenever the executive wants it requires senior personnel to obtain information based on their anticipation of the executive's interests and requests, the opportunity to present it, and the connecting of information between political, policy, budget, and practical implications (Tropp, 1974).

Respondents from the Tier 1 UASI regions held significant positions and portfolios, representing the trust their chief executive has in them. Yet, they also exerted significant control over the information flow between fusion centers and the executives. They either serve as the conduit for or firewall preventing information flow. As the conduit, the one respondent that had positive interactions with his fusion centers regularly engaged and established executive expectations for the fusion center. For respondents who were not satisfied with their fusion center services, their insights suggested that they were not confident enough with the fusion centers' capability to ensure that the executive's time was well spent in a briefing produced by the fusion center.

Thus, the engagement between chief executives and their fusion centers was decidedly mixed to nonexistent; and, consequently, the value of the fusion center to the chief executive was nil. Likewise, the value of senior personnel close to the chief executive providing the fusion center with insight to the chief executive's needs thereby improving fusion center services was lost. This is another dimension to the failure of some chief executives and fusion centers to engage mutually.

As noted in Chapters V and VI, trust is critical to mutual engagement of individuals and organizations. The more interaction, the more familiar, and the more consistent the exchange of information becomes. If the exchange of information is determined to be consistently accurate or correct, trust in that information and source can be established. Interview responses suggest that senior personnel interacting with the fusion centers feel that fusion centers are not living up to their potential in generating intelligence. One respondent said his fusion center regularly passes information on from other sources without any significant relevancy noted to their jurisdiction or environment. Without establishing trust with designated senior personnel, it becomes harder to engage directly with chief executives.

D. POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE

The concerns that political manipulation of intelligence will occur if mayors and governors are engaged in the intelligence development process are tenuous. If anything, the lack of chief executive oversight has caused fusion centers to continue to focus their efforts on operational and tactical needs of law enforcement. This can result in somewhat overlapping and duplication of missions with the local law enforcement agency and tends to narrow the fusion center's perspective and negate non-law enforcement agency participation in the intelligence process.

As seen in the Texas, Virginia, and Maryland examples, intelligence requirements and collection operations were developed without benefit of review and guidance from the executive level, resulting in activity of questionable legality and raising concerns of First Amendment rights violations. Activity in those states left the chief executives no alternative but to launch internal investigations on intelligence collection policies to reestablish the public trust. As noted in Chapter VI, chief executives are faced with a complex operating environment and are attuned to identifying issues that are political. Their executive oversight can

help steer fusion centers away from questionable practices, establish safeguards, and produce guidelines for intelligence operations.

Another dimension of fusion centers with respect to politicization is the potential influence of the host department's leadership on what the fusion center produces and how information is presented to external customers. There may be an aversion to fusion center products, which expose information that is potentially embarrassing, or that could result in criticism of the host department's effectiveness.

In all of considerations of politicization, it is important for a fusion center to have some independence from host agency influence and to have the support of a strong governance and oversight body. As one interview respondent noted in the interview response, when the high personnel costs for an event did not correspond with low threat assessment conducted by the same agency, the gap between intelligence and the effects on their resources can be easily manipulated by the host department.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter reveals that the President, arguably one of the busiest and high profile chief executives in the world, receives daily intelligence briefings to enhance his situational awareness. Why are mayors and governors not learning from this example and experience? What is keeping them from spending important time each day to receive regular intelligence updates? In all likelihood, they may not be aware that such capability exists and that it might be found in their fusion centers. The value added in effective fusion centers is in their ability to deliver strategic decision-making advantage to the chief executive. Senior personnel who are engaged with fusion centers may need to go through an executive requirements session to identify what is important to the executive. If executive requirements are given to fusion centers, and value is added; if an

excellent briefer is identified; and if daily executive briefings are delivered to their satisfaction, senior personnel become a conduit for information flow, then chief executives may soon realize what they have been missing.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

We can succeed only by concert. It is not "can *any* of us *imagine* better," but "can we *all* do better?" The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise—with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew [Abraham Lincoln, address to Congress in 1862]. (Phillips, 1993, p. 137)

This research leads to the conclusion that a significant number of mayors and governors of high threat, high population density urban areas are not directly and regularly engaging their fusion centers. Exploratory research also reveals that a significant number of mayors and governors, as the primary policy and decision makers for their jurisdictions, do not believe their fusion center is of value to them. During troubling economic times, mayors and governors who represent high threat and high population density urban areas may need to justify sustaining fusion centers to their constituency and to the federal government. With over 70 fusion centers established nationwide and over \$340 million dollars in federal grant funds and local and state funds invested in this local, regional, and state endeavor to support policy makers and other local and state agencies, the lack of engagement between chief executives and fusion centers needs to be course corrected. The following recommendations (Table 2) are proposed to help fusion centers deliver value in the form of knowledge and decision advantages to chief executives.

Table 2. Recommendations

Recommendations
A. Engage Mayors and Governors
B. Develop Executive Products and Services
C. Identify an Intelligence Translator
D. Educate Executives on the Intelligence Development Cycle
E. Explain Fusion Center Limitations
F. Proposed Value Innovation Framework

A. ENGAGE MAYORS AND GOVERNORS

Fusion centers should meet the needs of their customers, especially chief executives of large urban areas. In order to appropriately address executive needs, fusion centers should identify key senior personnel who can provide insights to the executive's interests, style, and preferences for receiving information. Senior personnel can either become conduits of information or barriers preventing the information flow. The challenge for fusion centers will be to establish familiarity with their capabilities and an ability to adapt collection, analysis, production, and services to meet the needs and interests of the staff who serve the chief executive. The more consistent the exchange of information, and when the more accuracy or usefulness of the information is demonstrated, the more trust and engagement will develop.

B. DEVELOP EXECUTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

In serving the chief executive's needs, fusion centers must find ways to innovate in their provision of intelligence. Major competitors are 24-hour cycle news media and social media networks for fast-breaking and developing events. Leveraging technology like Twitter or Facebook may be one method to compete in the provision of "current intelligence," but the higher value fusion centers can bring is making sense of if or how events impact the chief executive's jurisdiction. Fusion centers should leverage their resources to validate what is happening, reducing the initial period of uncertainty, and to develop the context for what is happening in their local jurisdictions. The chief executives' needs and interests in this respect require knowing the style and preferences of executives in general and delivering products and services tailored appropriately.

C. IDENTIFY AN INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATOR

A key aspect to engaging the executive is to be able to translate or frame the intelligence for the executive to understand the information they are receiving. A critical factor in developing executive focused products and services

is to tailor the intelligence to their needs and interests. Executives do not need the same scope of information or details as other customers. Their needs are unique, time-limited, and their interests are wide ranging. Chief executives should have briefings or other products that are exclusive to them, their language, and can help them understand how the intelligence can support future policies or actions. Having an intelligence translator or a rotation of intelligence briefers trained to the same standards to brief the executive and providing regular briefings will help the executive become more familiar with the process.

D. EDUCATE EXECUTIVES ON THE INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

The majority of interview results did not reflect executive involvement in developing, stating, or levying intelligence and policy needs. In order to identify policy issues or areas that chief executives need and desire, they must be educated in the intelligence development process. This can best be achieved through discussions with senior personnel who interact with the executive on a regular basis. Insight to the executive's interests can also be found in the policies introduced, legislation developed, announcements made through websites, interviews, and other sources reflecting the executive's priorities in the context of the jurisdiction's environment.

E. EXPLAIN FUSION CENTER LIMITATIONS

Fusion centers must not oversell their capabilities. They must make their capabilities and limitations known to temper executive expectations. In explaining what can and cannot be accomplished and why, fusion centers can also illustrate to the chief executive what additional capabilities they need in order to be successful in adding value for the chief executive. In establishing needed additional capabilities, fusion centers are also helping to identify their resource needs to meet the executive's demands.

F. PROPOSED VALUE INNOVATION FRAMEWORK

Table 3. Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-CREATE Grid (after Kim & Mauborgne, 2005)

<u>Eliminate</u>	<u>Raise</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bureaucratic layers • “Need to Know” mentality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing culture • Collaboration with public
<u>Reduce</u>	<u>Create</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information sharing restrictions • Intelligence developed through stovepipes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk sharing approach • Public trust and confidence

The following proposal incorporates a *Blue Ocean Strategy* framework for fusion centers to be a value innovation for mayors and governors (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). In order to create the value innovation in fusion centers, Table 3 borrows the four actions concept offered by the *Blue Ocean Strategy* and identifies the issues based on interviews on improving fusion center value to eliminate, reduce, and the values to raise, and create.

Table 3 reflects the research and exploratory interview results which indicate that current fusion centers are not providing the executive with intelligence relevant to adaptive government behavior and policies and are not providing added value to chief executives. The strategy canvas (Figure 3) shows a “before” and “after” fusion center based on the four actions in Table 3. Current fusion centers represent the “before” perspective that delivers low value to chief executives in the following areas: bureaucratic layers in the classification process, detrimental “need to know” culture, federal interference by withholding of information or lack of timeliness in sharing information, restrictions on information sharing with others who do not have clearances, stovepiping intelligence solely for law enforcement purposes, and not providing an all hazards perspective.

Fusion centers supporting mayors and governors represent the “after” perspective of fusion centers delivering the value proposition to chief executives. This includes the types of information that help shape government policies and change behaviors, increases the executive’s opportunities to collaborate with the public, provide the executive with risk-sharing approaches with non-government partners, and increases the public’s trust and confidence. The effect of the proposed value innovation framework is seen in the strategy canvas where, ultimately, mayors and governors finally receive the value added support they need to lead and operate in their jurisdiction.

Strategy Canvas: Fusion Center Value for Mayors and Governors




Figure 3. Strategy Canvas: Fusion Center Value for Mayors and Governors

Fusion centers must be adaptive and responsive to change, especially now given the low perception of value of fusion centers uncovered in this research. Beyond adapting, they must make themselves indispensable in the chief executives’ arsenal of situational awareness tools and demonstrate irrefutable credibility, reliability, objectivity, and capability to help translate

mundane intelligence into engaging knowledge and decision-making advantage for chief executives. Furthermore, fusion centers must help mayors and governors develop a risk sharing approach with an engaged public and achieve public trust and confidence in their role and efforts supporting chief executives.

IX. CONCLUSION

If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less [Eric Shinseki, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff]. (Peters, 2003, p. 3)

This thesis provides, through exploratory interviews, insights to the Tier 1 UASI chief executives' current level of engagement and satisfaction with their fusion centers. It also offers a view of the executive's approach to daily tactical and long-term strategic planning, and how information and intelligence is usually obtained by the executive office, from existing sources and presentation formats established by the executive.

While local and state chief executives are at the forefront of defending the nation, they also find themselves confronted with tremendous fiscal pressures, increasing demands for human services, local and regional crime, natural disasters, an aggressive new media, and an increasingly technologically astute political observing and reporting community. The demands on their time and leadership are much higher than were on their counterparts a decade ago. While the tools that exist today have the means to help local and state leaders, the proliferation of fusion centers and their evolution continues to suggest that they have yet to define or realize their full potential and value. Mayors and governors representing the highest risk urban areas should have the means for directly engaging with their fusion centers with a full and justified expectation of receiving the information they need for decision making and effective governing.

The key to answering part of the thesis topic, *Tell Me What I Need to Know*, is specific to the executive based on his or her personality, style, and interest level. It is also almost entirely dependent on the observant senior personnel close to the chief executive who are willing to offer meaningful, realistic guidance to the fusion center. The key to answering the second part of

the thesis topic, *What Mayors and Governors Want from their Fusion Center*, depends on the requirements and policy questions directly provided by the executive or through observant, knowledgeable senior personnel.

What can be learned about the value of fusion centers, from the perspective of chief executives whose jurisdictions encompass major, high threat urban areas? The chief executive should be the most important political/policy level customer. However, while executive support is a high priority mission, it should not be the only fusion center mission. The fusion center should also serve other departments' needs.

Exploratory interviews reveal that the majority mayors and governors of Tier 1 UASI jurisdictions want to avoid surprises and be positioned to anticipate changes in their operating environment. However, such chief executives do not regularly engage with and do not find satisfaction in their fusion centers. The disconnect lies in the lack of familiarity with their fusion centers and their capabilities, and the arrangement chief executives have or do not have in place for engagement with the fusion centers.

As noted in earlier chapters, a significant number of fusion centers are all hazards and all crimes focused, are typically led by law enforcement agencies, and do not have a global all hazards perspective. This makes them self-limiting and open to criticism, and for some, may lead to eventual failure. Fusion centers that have evolved towards an all-hazards focus but, under the oversight of law enforcement authorities, may continue to struggle in achieving their broader, all-hazards mission given the focus of law enforcement agencies who desire tactical support for their all crimes mission.

Responses by senior personnel on behalf of their chief executives demonstrated that they were the most familiar executive level persons with the fusion center and served as either the firewall or conduit between the executive and their fusion centers. If the fusion services and products were perceived as irrelevant or of poor quality and did not provide added value for the executive, the

firewall was in place to prevent the busy executive wasting time. If the services and products were perceived as useful and insightful, the conduit existed to allow information to flow to the executive.

Significantly, responses also revealed that senior personnel were not satisfied with fusion center services. Responses reflected general sentiments that the services were not tailored for the executive's needs, information was not relevant to the executive's purview and jurisdictions, and other news media sources were providing real-time and competing information, which make fusion center services and products inferior and irrelevant. Additional concerns regarding federal level classifications preventing information sharing and limiting access were expressed, which suggested that the information sharing environment set forth by the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* has not been successful.

The revelation that senior personnel served as either the firewall or conduit for assessing and deciding executive engagement of fusion centers led to additional research on how the President is served by the Director of National Intelligence today and by the Director of Central Intelligence prior to establishment of the DNI position. Insights from this model and the role of senior personnel formed the recommendations for this research. Recommendations include developing a trusting relationship with the executive's senior personnel in order to leverage the conduit for conveying information to the executive. By using the senior personnel to identify the executive's policy interests and by educating those staff officials in the intelligence development cycle and the need for their involvement to understand the executive's personality and style, fusion centers can develop the appropriate means for delivering value added information and intelligence services and sustain their programs.

The key role of intelligence is to inform the decision-making process, support policy execution, and provide knowledge and decision advantages for the policy maker. As noted in Chapter I, the ultimate goal of the fusion center is to help the decision maker prepare for interacting within the operating

environment of the city or state. Fusion centers, if fully engaged by their mayors and governors, should add value by providing strategic decision-making advantages to chief executives.

To achieve value innovation, chief executives and fusion centers should build towards more risk sharing with the public, involve it in developing methods for preventing crises, and establish public trust and confidence in the intelligence gained and risk and crisis information shared.

Local and state governments have been under tremendous strain and pressure to seek for ways to balance their budgets while sustaining their local needs and security demands. The federal government has begun to look for ways to reduce costs of entitlement programs and other grant programs. As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, almost all states rely on federal homeland security grants for sustaining major aspects of their jurisdiction's homeland security programs. All levels of government will be reevaluating inefficient programs and fusion centers may not survive the next evolution if mayors and governors continue to perceive them as not adding value to their prevention of terrorism and threats. Fusion centers may be at significant risk of being eliminated if they fail to adapt to the specific needs, requirements, styles, and personalities of their mayors and governors. Ultimately, fusion centers need to resonate with and be responsive to the needs of their chief executives or become irrelevant to policy makers.

A. FUTURE RESEARCH

As noted in the research design, exploratory interviews of Tier 1 UASI executive offices should only serve as a beginning point to understanding the current level of chief executive engagement and satisfaction with fusion centers. The narrow scope of this research does not address all other issues regarding the capabilities of fusion centers to provide adequate and value added services to the key policy makers and operational entities they serve. Future research should include direct feedback from chief executives on their engagement of

fusion centers, gauging executive reception of fusion center services, and the uses of the intelligence to support policies and decisions.

Another area for future research should include measurements of the satisfaction with services. While it is evident that the lack of executive engagement contributes to the inadequacy of fusion center services for the executive, future research should also identify the appropriate level of fusion staffing and funding to ensure that executive needs are met.

Further research on how localities and states rate the federal efforts since the release of the *National Strategy for Information Sharing* could identify the gaps preventing effective collaboration and trust building among partners working with fusion centers.

A study about how to groom effective fusion center leaders, including executive level development, organizational behavior, business and client relationships, classification issues, effective intelligence analysis, and reporting is needed to ensure that fusion centers are sustainable.

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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following questions were directed to Tier 1 UASI mayors and governors, and their senior staff, through email and phone interviews.

The services that a fusion center provides include, but are not limited to, the following: face-to-face briefings, tailored threat assessments, first alert reporting, intelligence preparation of the city's environment. Given this context:

1. Are you a direct consumer of fusion center information?
2. Do you receive regular fusion center briefings? Do you read their products?
3. What types of information do you regularly receive in briefings? On what did you expect to be briefed?
4. How often do you actively request information from the fusion center? What types of information have you requested?
5. If you have provided feedback to the fusion center, what types of feedback did you provide?
6. Have you received tailored products or briefings as a result of earlier feedback? Were you satisfied with the product or briefing?
7. Have you expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the level of information received from the fusion center? Please provide examples of satisfactory or unsatisfactory information, services, or products.
8. Are there examples of when fusion produced intelligence has assisted in a policy decision, help shape policies, planning, and budgets? Please provide examples.
9. Does it matter to you if the briefings are at the classified or unclassified level? Why?
10. What type of information and products are you interested in receiving from the fusion center? For example: key international events, coast-to-coast U.S. events, select IC analysis on terrorism and global economic intelligence, terrorist attacks on global infrastructure, etc.

11. What if anything, does your fusion center need to do to be of value to you in making key decisions about homeland security plans, preventions, and responses?
12. What do you see as the future of your fusion center?

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW RESPONSE HIGHLIGHTS

Questions	Highlights of Responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are you a direct consumer of fusion center information? 	5 yes, 1 no.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do you receive regular fusion center briefings? • Read their products? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 yes, 1 no. • 5 yes, 1 no.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What types of information do you regularly receive in briefings? • What do you expect to be briefed on but have not? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receive Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) info, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR), Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) hits, local crime data, health and fire arson indicators, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive (CBRNE), international and domestic attack information. • Have not received linkages of info to local and regional issues; have not received analytical patterns and information.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How often do you actively request information from the fusion center? • What types of information have you requested? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responses ranged from never to request for weekly and annual info. • Requests include: H1N1; general public health information; workplace violence; Islamabad attacks; Mumbai attacks; relevancy of international incidences to local jurisdictions; stolen government vehicles and property trend; nexus to terrorism; classified briefings; SAR trends; regional gang information; property foreclosure data and connection to crime; and annual threat assessment.
If you have provided feedback to the fusion center, what types of feedback did you provide?	<p>One respondent said “none except for appreciation.” Other responses included phrases such as “relevancy”, “What’s the value added?” “How is this different from CNN or other media sources?”</p> <p>General responses indicated need for timeliness, synthesis. Information is transactional and not revelatory or actionable with recommendations. Need for specificity not generalities. Lack of connection to day-to-day issues such as crime patterns and local threats or risks. Need more tactical and strategic info on attacks overseas. Don’t overload, overwhelm the reader with general information they already know. Highlight unique information to set it apart from other channels, such as 24-hour news media; economic briefings for their jurisdictions.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have you received tailored products or briefings as a result of earlier feedback? • Were you satisfied with the product or briefing? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One respondent said they received a briefing on an overseas incident after an initial fusion center briefing. • All but 2 responses said they were generally dissatisfied with products and briefings
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have you expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the level of information received from the fusion center? • Please provide examples of satisfactory or unsatisfactory information, services or products. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only one specific response was provided about how satisfied they and their executive were with the level of information provided by their fusion center. Other general responses: information was not specific to the target audience; information developed as general fit-all and not tailored; concerns that the fusion center was focused on information that was not what the executive requested • Daily summaries and briefings were too general.
<p>Are there examples of when fusion produced intelligence has assisted in a policy decision, help shape policies, planning and budgets? Please provide examples.</p>	<p>Responses included a lack of understanding for the executive's environment and purview; gap existed between threat assessment and asset deployment; information on mitigating vulnerabilities would inform policies. Lack of timing in providing information negatively impacted ability to plan ahead on budgets and strategy</p>
<p>Does it matter to you if the briefings are at the classified or unclassified level? Why?</p>	<p>All but 2 respondents said they wanted classified information because it might include higher level of detail. One respondent said the lack of useful information from classified side suggested lack of collaboration or trust in information sharing between federal and local fusion center. Three respondents said that they believe the FBI field offices withheld information from their fusion centers. One respondent wanted information on classified level as a courtesy notification to the chief executive. Another respondent did not have clearance to receive classified level briefings. One respondent indicated that a request for information from their fusion center was rebuffed by the FBI because there was not a "need to know" for the locality or state. Another respondent said "how do I know what I don't know?" One respondent indicated that the quality of classified information was a let down since assumption was that it would provide more specificity.</p>

What type of information and products are you interested in receiving from the fusion center? For example: key international events, coast-to-coast U.S. events, select IC analysis on terrorism and global economic intelligence, terrorist attacks on global infrastructure, etc.	Responses included: risk and crisis information that can be shared with the public; non-law enforcement centric information; federal intelligence; local economic indicators; critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies; not pass through regurgitation of federal products and analysis but implications and specificity to locality and state; international and US events, particularly specific threats to cities, ports, and airports in the U.S..
What if anything, does your fusion center need to do to be of value to you in making key decisions about homeland security plans, preventions, and responses?	Responses included: to provide information that is relevant to jurisdiction; to have specific information; to provide true fusion and analysis of data and not just pass unsynthesized information on; become useful to the chief executive; provide predictive information that can influence government actions, planning, prevention, and response. One respondent said it has strong value and is already integrated very well into the workings of the jurisdiction.
What do you see as the future of your fusion center?	Responses included: hoping fusion centers become valuable to executive in that he or she receives regular briefings; flow intelligence from local level up to federal level; central point for information analysis and intelligence generated; not sure if it will continue in the current way.

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